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VOLUME 44 NUMBER 3 SPRING 1977
Civilizing Pornography: The Case For An Exclusive
Obscenity Nuisance Statute
Doug Rendlemant
Criminal penalties are increasingly perceived to be too se-
vere for regulating obscenity. Professor Rendleman shares this
perception and suggests that we replace criminal obscenity
laws with an exclusive civil sanction utilizing injunctions. He
proposes a comprehensive nuisance statute and discusses the
various issues that arise in the equitable regulation of
pornography.
If there ever was a consensus in American society about the
proper role of the government in controlling pornography, that con-
sensus is breaking down. To be sure prosecutors continue to enjoy
popular support for pursuing the distributors of obscenity. But the
distributors have become emboldened by their own commercially
lucrative, if silent, public support, and by the growing conviction
among civil libertarians that any form of restriction on the availabil-
ity of sexually explicit expression to consenting adults is incompati-
ble with the first amendment.' In the face of this eroding consensus,
the law, at least at the state legislative level, is moving slowly but
inexorably toward less instrusive methods of regulating obscenity.2
t Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. The author drew on fifteen years'
experience as a motion picture projectionist. Richard Foster and Barbara Jones, research
associates, helped to prepare this article.
I This is the position of Justice Brennan in McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 678
(1976) (concurring opinion); and in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83-85 (1973)
(dissenting opinion). Justice Tobriner articulates this view forcefully in his dissent in Bloom
v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 86-100, 545 P.2d 229, 239-48, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317, 327-36
(1976).
2 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2 (Supp. 1975); N.D. Cmr. CODE §§ 12.1-27.1-01
to 27.1-12 (Repl. Vol., 1976).
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As Justice Tobriner of the California Supreme Court has remarked
about resistance to this change, "the would-be legislative and judi-
cial King Canutes must fail in ordering back the waves of a cultural
revolution.'3
In the absence of a cultural consensus, the practice of imposing
criminal penalties for the distribution of pornography seems harsh
and anachronistic. A number of states have begun to supplement
criminal punishment with civil sanctions.' This article advocates
that the states go one step further, and abandon criminal penalties
in favor of an exclusive civil remedy providing for injunctive relief
against obscenity. Civilizing pornography through obscenity nuis-
ance actions would temper the harshness of the cultural conflict. It
would also provide an appropriate way station in the process of
cultural transformation.
The article does not discuss the issues involved in defining con-
stitutionally suppressable obscenity.' Others have addressed the
definitional problems with skill and erudition.' Rather, the focus is
Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 99, 545 P.2d 229, 248, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317,
336 (1976) (dissenting opinion).
Thus, civil actions have been brought against theaters, see, e.g., N.D.D., Inc. v. Faches,
385 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Airways Theater, Inc. v. Canale, 366 F. Supp. 343 (W.D.
Tenn. 1973); Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask, 326 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Ohio 1970), vacated, 413 U.S.
902 (1973); and against bookstores. See, e.g., Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333 (1974); Classic
Distribs., Inc. v. Zimmerman, 387 F. Supp. 829 (M.D. Pa. 1974); People v. Goldman, 7 Ill.
App. 3d 253, 287 N.E.2d 177 (1972); State ex rel. Blee v. Mohney Enterprises, 154 Ind. App.
244, 289 N.E.2d 519 (1972); Giarrusso v. New Orleans Book Mart, Inc., 304 So. 2d 734 (La.
Ct. of App. 1974); McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1975); State ex rel. Field v. Hess,
540 P.2d 1165 (Okla. 1975). Some actions have been brought against both theaters and
bookstores. See, e.g., General Corp. v. Sweeton, 365 F. Supp. 1182 (M.D. Ala. 1973), vacated
and remanded sub nom. MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799 (1975); People ex rel. Busch v.
Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
' See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), in which the Supreme Court
enunciated the following test for determining whether expression is constitutionally unpro-
tected obscenity:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person,
applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the w6rk, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.
Id. at 24. The Court provided the following examples of the types of specifically defined sexual
depictions that could be proscribed under part (b) of the test:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, nor-
mal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory
functions, and lewd exhibitior of the genitals.
Id. at 25.
6 See, e.g., F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENrry 69-166 (1976); Lockhart, Escape from the
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on the consequences of different ways of regulating unprotected
obscenity. The article begins by considering the case against crimi-
nal regulation. It concludes that a civil remedy is preferable, and
proposes a civil statute that displaces criminal obscenity laws. The
issues involved in equitable regulation of obscenity are then dis-
cussed in light of the proposed statute. Particular attention is given
to the need to reconcile equitable regulation with the constitutional
proscription of prior restraints.
I. ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS FOR REGULATING OBSCENITY
Societies regulate repugnant conduct in a variety of ways, rang-
ing from criminal sanctions to social ostracism and moral condem-
nation.7 This article is concerned with the relative merits and de-
merits of the two most commonly encountered legal sanctions for
the dissemination of obscenity-criminal punishment and civil in-
junctions.
The differences between criminal and equitable regulation may
at first seem inconsequential. Both establish a legal rule forbidding
certain conduct and impose unpleasant consequences upon a viola-
tor-criminal punishment or contempt-for the infraction of this
rule. 8 The differences are even more elusive when the legislature
adds a statute to the criminal code allowing the state to seek injunc-
tions of criminal obscenity Injunctive control of obscenity, the
Supreme Court has understated, "is more akin to a criminal prose-
cution than are most civil cases."10
There are, however, at least four important differences between
injunctions and criminal regulation. First, the civil procedure fol-
lowed in obtaining injunctive relief is not encumbered by the special
barriers created for the protection of criminal defendants, barriers
that reflect the preference of our system for freeing the guilty rather
than convicting the innocent. Of particular importance are the
guarantee of trial by jury and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, neither of which is found in a proceeding in
equity.
1
Second, an injunction, unlike a criminal statute, is personal-
ized and precise. An injunction singles out the defendant, identifies
Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First Amendment, 9 GA. L. Rlv. 533 (1975).
'See H. PACKER, THE LiMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 320 (1968).
See id. at 18-21.
See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-27.1-01 to 27.1-12 (Rep. Vol. 1976).
"Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
" See People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 880, 118 P.2d 472, 476 (1941).
19771
The University of Chicago Law Review
the discrete material that is obscene, and warns the defendant to
cease distributing this material. A criminal statute, in contrast,
provides only a generalized warning to all the world phrased in
terms of an abstract definition.
Third, an injunction is directed toward regulating future con-
duct instead of punishing past conduct. 12 An injunction in effect
requires two violations before the state may punish the violator. As
a result, after being enjoined, the defendants go home; after losing
a criminal prosecution, they may not. Moreover, although some
stigma and economic loss undoubtedly attach to being enjoined,'3
the social and financial impact of incarceration is undoubtedly
greater. 4 Thus, most potential offenders would prefer an injunction
to a criminal conviction, with its potential loss of liberty and other
collateral consequences. 15
Fourth, the sanctions for violation differ. Although criminal
contempt for breach of an injunction is manifestly retributive,"
contempt in general is not congruent with criminal punishment.
Rather, contempt shares the remedial flexibility that characterizes
all forms of equitable relief. When a defendant violates an injunc-
tion, the court may impose compensatory sanctions, designed to
restore a wronged party to the status quo, or coercive sanctions,
designed to achieve compliance. 7 At the same time, contempt has
a draconian aspect not shared by penal sanctions. The court asks
only two questions in a contempt proceeding: Did the contemnor
know of the injunction? And did the contemnor violate the
injunction? If these questions are answered in the affirmative, the
collateral bar rule allows the court to punish the contemnor even if
he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct.'8 This seems
harsh. But if a defendant has received notice of the injunction and
has had a full opportunity to litigate its issuance, the collateral bar
in contempt is not too great a price to pay for orderly decision-
making and respect for the courts.
12 See Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 496-97, 22 N.W. 641, 646 (1885).
13 Cf. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1974) (appellants claimed injunction
endangered their livelihood).
, See H. PACKER, supra note 7, at 36.
, See 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 154 (1972); R. RANDALL, CENSORSHIP OF THE MOVIES 147-50
(1968); C. REMBAR, THE END OF OBSCENITY 228 (1968).
16 Cf. Maita v. Whitmore, 508 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1974) (sixth amendment right to jury
trial in contempt proceedings for violation of injunction to be determined by same standards
applicable to criminal offenses).
17 D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.9 at 98-101 (1973).
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
' See Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 121.
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A. The Case Against Criminal Sanctions
The criminal approach to the control of obscenity seems more
repressive and anachronistic every day. Perhaps the major problem
is that obscenity doctrine is simply too arcane and unpredictable to
support criminal sanctions. As Justice Douglas has asserted, "to
send men to jail for violating standards they cannot understand,
construe and apply is a monstrous thing to do in a Nation dedicated
to fair trials and due process."2 Justice Stevens has also recently
added his voice to those critics who contend that the line between
offensive and inoffensive communication is too blurred to identify
criminal conduct.
21
The severity of criminal sanctions is itself partly responsible for
the unpredictability of obscenity law. Merchants cannot learn what
is forbidden until the factfinder has rendered its verdict, but be-
cause few are willing to risk imprisonment, the precise standards
delimiting protected and unprotected sexually explicit expression
remain largely unknown. Undoubtedly, distributors are inhibited
from disseminating sexually explicit material that would not ulti-
mately be found to be obscene.
Criminal penalties not only have a chilling effect on first
amendment rights, they also impede the effective suppression of
genuine obscenity. Because of our solicitude for personal liberty and
our desire to protect individuals from state power, we have encum-
bered the criminal law with prophylactic rules. These rules increase
the complexity of criminal prosecutions, and suppressable obscenity
may escape interdiction because the authorities have violated a
defendant's procedural rights. Moreover, criminal proceedings are
expensive and protracted, and officials may decide that scarce pro-
secutorial resources are better spent elsewhere.
Criminal laws against obscenity also share the disadvantages of
sumptuary laws in general. Consumption of pornography, like con-
sumption of liquor, narcotics, or the services of prostitutes, is a
"victimless" crime, in which there is no harmed person to complain
to the authorities. To enforce this type of law, the authorities must
participate in the forbidden commerce. This leads to unseemly and
overreaching enforcement tactics 2 and diverts police from protect-
But see In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 155-56, 436 P.2d 273, 285-86, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 285-86
(1968) (collateral bar dropped).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 43-44 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
2 Smith v. United States, 97 S.Ct. 1756 (1977) (dissenting opinion). See also Ward v.
Illinois, 97 S.Ct. 2085 (1977) (dissenting opinion); Marks v. United States, 97 S.Ct. 990, 996
(1977) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2 See H. PACKER, supra note 7, at 151.
1977l
The University of Chicago Law Review
ing people and property.
Moreover, there is some evidence that sumptuary criminal stat-
utes actually stimulate crime. Prohibition illustrates that when the
legislature declares a commodity illegal, a criminal market devel-
ops. The criminal sanction, by increasing the risk to sellers, de-
creases the number of sellers in the market and raises the price of
the forbidden commodity. The sellers may then use the profits from
their quasi-monopoly to corrupt the enforcers or finance other crimi-
nal enterprises. 23
Criminal proscriptions often repose on the statute books long
after they have become superannuated by the passage of time or by
conscious hypocrisy. However, society informally tolerates much
that it formally forbids and it is possible to argue that these statutes
are justified for their symbolic value, incorporating aspirations or
ideals that society fails to observe strictly. The response to this line
of reasoning is twofold. First, widespread violation of unenforced
legislation draws the rest of the law into disrepute. Second, leaving
largely unenforced statutes on the books creates the potential for
abuse of prosecutorial discretion through selective enforcement
against minorities or politically disfavored groups.
24
Civil remedies would not eliminate all of the difficulties gener-
ated by the use of criminal sanctions. But civil jurisdiction would
ameliorate most of the adverse consequences produced by criminal
regulation. Before turning to consideration of the civil alternatives,
however, a closer examination of the unique dangers of a regime
allowing both civil and criminal sanctions is required.
B. The Perils of Dual Sanctions
Several states supplement criminal penalties for the regulation
of pornography with equitable remedies. Parallel sanctions are not
unique to obscenity regulation. At the turn of the century, dual
remedies existed to curb both saloons and houses of prostitution,
nuisances that involve cultural conflict, a forbidden commodity,
and a victimless offense, as does modern obscenity. But as applied
to pornography the solution of parallel remedies contains a potential
for prosecutorial harassment that could easily chill free expression.
For this reason dual remedies for obscenity are unwise, and legisla-
tures would be well advised to repeal criminal obscenity and replace
it with an exclusive civil statute. This conclusion is supported by
23 Id. at'278-79.
24 See generally K. DAvis, POLICE DISCRETION (1975).
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examining obscenity litigation and the relationship between crimi-
nal and civil actions.
The requirement that an equitable judgment be obtained be-
fore beginning a criminal prosecution for obscenity has often been
hailed as a way of curing the inherent vagueness of criminal obscen-
ity statutes,2 for declaratory judgments or injunctions allow obscen-
ity to be determined without the immediate threat of criminal sanc-
tions. Justice Douglas has argued that "until a civil proceeding has
placed a tract beyond the pale, no criminal prosecution should be
sustained. 28 The President's Commission on Obscenity and Por-
nography recommended that a civil declaration normally be a prere-
quisite for a criminal prosecution. 2 And because of the "in terrorem
effect"2 8 of criminal sanctions, a majority of the Supreme Court
approved the use of prior civil procedures to determine whether the
material sought to be suppressed is protected by the first amend-
ment.
29
Instead of requiring the bookseller to dread that the offer for
sale of a book may, without prior warning, subject him to a
criminal prosecution with the hazard of imprisonment, the
civil procedure assures him that such consequences cannot fol-
low unless he ignores a court order specifically directed to
him .... 11
Civil notice decreases self-censorship and advances a first amend-
ment goal-the "dissemination of constitutionally protected litera-
ture."
31
However, adding a civil remedy brings an additional weapon to
the prosecutorial arsenal. When public passion against "filth" runs
high, the authorities not infrequently single out particular purve-
yors and concentrate prosecutorial resources on them. The reporters
are replete with examples of multiple seizures and arrests.3 2 Regard-
' See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 42-43 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343, 350 (Mo. 1975) (Seiler, C.J., dissenting and concurring
in result); UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 63 (1970) [hereinafter cited as COMM'N ON
OBSCENITY]; F. SCHAUER, supra note 6, at 197-98.
26 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 41 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
" COMM'N ON OBSCENITY, supra note 25, at 63; Lockhart, supra note 6, at 569. See also
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 281 (Supp. 1977).
" Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 442 (1957).
" Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 (1973).
" Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 442 (1957).
31 McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 683 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
12 See, e.g., Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 46-56 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
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less of the outcome, a series of legal actions burdens the merchant
with uncertainty and attorney's fees. A period of sustained pressure
may result in a "gentlemen's agreement" between a merchant and
the authorities, or may result in the merchant acceding to self-
regulation, the most effective form of prior restraint. Multiple suit
harassment may even destroy a small and vulnerable business.
Furthermore, when multiple remedies are available, nothing
prevents the authorities from maintaining contemporaneous actions
against a defendant. The authorities may proceed, in single or in
separate actions, with as many legal theories as they possess: zoning
violations, building code infractions, public nuisance, and criminal
charges.3 But nuisance or other civil actions are more than merely
another string for a prosecutor's bow. Since nontestimonial civil
evidence can frequently be used in a later criminal prosecution,
34
defendants may suspect, perhaps accurately, that the authorities
have resorted to equity to discover for the criminal prosecutor. An
equitable proceeding may also be an end in itself if it allows ex parte
procedure or injunctions that close a nuisance down, 35 or it may be
a refuge from juries and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Normally res judicata and, to a lesser extent, stare decisis pro-
tect a defendant from a plaintiff's multiple suit harassment. Brief
examination shows, however, that res judicata provides scant pro-
tection against harassment where dual remedies are available. One
reason for this is that the regionally variable standard of obscenity
adopted by Miller v. Californiall dilutes the res judicata and prece-
dential value of all obscenity judgments. Because obscenity turns
on the way the audience perceives the material instead of on the
material itself, a judgment's effect may be limited to the territory
occupied by that audience 7.3 Something legally obscene in Washing-
ton, North Carolina, may be standard fare a few hundred miles
See, e.g., Llewelyn v. Oakland County Prosecutor's Office, 402 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D.
Mich. 1975).
3' See, e.g., Taylor v. State ex rel. Kirkpatrick, 529 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Tenn. 1975); N.D.
CENr. CODE § 12.1-27.1-06(4) (Repl. Vol. 1976).
" See, e.g., State v. Gulf Theatres, Inc., 270 So. 2d 547, 555-57 (La. 1972) (Tate, J.,
dissenting), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S. 913 (1973), rev'd. on remand, 287 So. 2d 496
(La. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974).
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
7 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2(f) (Supp. 1975) (judgment not res judicata
outside judicial district); United Theatres of Florida, Inc. v. State, 259 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1972), modified, 323 So. 2d 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (injunction against
showing of obscene materials may not run throughout the state); State ex rel. Little Beaver
Theatre, Inc. v. Tobin, 258 So. 2d 30, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (same); F. ScHAuEa, supra
note 6, at 221.
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north in Washington, D.C. 8 Thus, a regional or national distributor
of sexually explicit material often cannot obtain a definitive answer
to the question whether particular material is obscene.
Where parallel remedies are permitted, the order in which civil
or criminal proceedings are brought and the outcome of the initial
proceeding are also of critical importance in determining the res
judicata effect of the prior judgment. A prior successful criminal
prosecution may ease a later civil action to enjoin an obscenity
nuisance. In some jurisdictions, statutes provide that criminal con-
viction is either conclusive proof1 9 or prima facie evidence" that a
nuisance exists.41 And under standard preclusion doctrine the state
may employ res judicata to enjoin a convicted criminal defendant
from continuing to exhibit or sell the matter litigated and deter-
mined to be obscene.
42
On the other hand, an unsuccessful prior criminal prosecution
may have no effect on a later civil suit, for the state's failure to show
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial does not preclude
it from attempting, in a later civil action, to meet the less rigorous
preponderance standard.4 3 Nevertheless, the Iowa Supreme Court,
in a liquor nuisance appeal, held that a criminal acquittal precluded
the state from maintaining an equitable suit to condemn the liquor
as a nuisance." Professor Vestal criticized this decision for ignoring
the differing standards of proof. 5 Perhaps the Iowa court interposed
the shield of res judicata through concern for the policies that re-
quire a plaintiff to elect his remedies and that forbid splitting a
cause of action-repose for the defendant, the preservation of scarce
1 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973); United States v. McManus, 535 F.2d
460, 464 (8th Cir. 1976); McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343, 347-48 (Mo. 1975); Edelstein &
Mott, Collateral Problems in Obscenity Regulation: A Uniform Approach to Prior Restraints,
Community Standards, and Judgment Preclusion, 7 SrroN HALL L. REv. 543, 569-70 (1976).
' See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 1107 (1960); IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-10 (1973).
40 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3767.05 (1953).
Though a provision of the latter type was attacked in an Ohio case as reversing the
burden of proof, the state had there already proved obscenity beyond a reasonable doubt, and
the owner had had an opportunity and the incentive to contest the criminal charge. Grove
Press, Inc. v. Flask, 326 F. Supp. 574, 579 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
42 See Raleigh v. United States, 351 A.2d 510 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976); A. VESTAL, RES
JUDICATA PRECLUSION V-374-78, V-411 (1969); Edelstein & Mott, supra note 38, at 583; F.
SCHAUER, supra note 6, at 219-22. Some states vest the criminal court with power to enjoin
the obscenity upon the entry of the criminal judgment. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-7-
105 (1973).
"' See State ex rel. Threlkeld v. Osborne, 207 Iowa 636, 223 N.W. 633 (1929); A. VESTAL,
supra note 42, at V-368; Edelstein & Mott, supra note 38, at 584-85.
" State ex rel. Hanrahan v. Miller, 250 Iowa 1358, 96 N.W.2d 474, 477 (1959).
Is A. VESTAL, supra note 42, at V-370.
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judicial resources, and the protection of citizens from harassment.
But the Iowa decision is an exception to standard preclusion doc-
trine.
What effect does a judgment for the defendant in a civil injunc-
tion action have on a later criminal prosecution? Here the preclu-
sion rules should combine with res judicata to bar the second law-
suit. If the government fails to prove obscenity by a preponderance
of the evidence, then the court should forbid it from attempting to
prove the same issue beyond a reasonable doubt."
Finally, there is the troubling question of the effect of a judg-
ment of obscenity in an earlier civil action on a later criminal case.
As we have seen, because the civil action's warning features obviate
much of the uncertainty of obscenity law, the use of prior civil
judgments appeals to many. But there are a number of difficulties
with this approach.47 Under traditional res judicata principles, when
the government wins a civil nuisance suit, it cannot take advantage
of that decision in a later criminal prosecution for the same conduct.
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence in the earlier nuisance
action falls short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal
prosecution.48 In some jurisdictions a civil judgment creates a pre-
sumption of guilt or establishes an element of the crime."9 But the
state must prove each element of a criminal case beyond a reasona-
ble doubt" and must allow the criminal defendant the opportunity
to confront and cross-examine the state's witnesses.51 "In light of the
command of the First Amendment," Justice Brennan reminds us,
"a standard of proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence poses
too substantial a danger that protected material will be erroneously
suppressed. 51 2 Thus, in order to bind a later criminal prosecution,
the burden of proof in the civil base should equal or exceed proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.53 Moreover, while a criminal defendant
is entitled to demand a jury trial, the civil nuisance may be judge
tried; and res judicata doctrine cannot be used to deprive defen-
dants of a jury trial on an issue properly triable to a jury. 4
Is See A. VESTAL, supra note 42, at V-368; Edelstein & Mott, supra note 38, at 584.
V See generally People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P.2d 472 (1941).
" A. VESTAL, supra note 42, at V-366; Edelstein & Mott, supra note 38, 582-83.
4' See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS AN. ch. 272, § 28H (Supp. 1977) (civil action creates
conclusive presumption of knowledge of book's obscenity); VA. CODE § 18.2-384(13) (Repl.
Vol. 1975) (civil action establishes scienter).
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
5, See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965).
52 McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 685 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 687.
See Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1970) (relying on Beacon Theatres, Inc.
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An important recent decision directly bearing on this problem
is McKinney v. Alabama, 5 in which the Supreme Court unani-
mously struck down a state statute that permitted material pre-
viously declared obscene in a civil action to be introduced in a
criminal proceeding, with the criminal defense limited to whether
the material had been knowingly sold. Since the defendant had not
been a party to the civil action, he was effectively precluded from
refuting the charge that the material was obscene. The Court viewed
with grave misgivings any procedure that purports to bind a later
determination unless everyone the state presumes to bind by the
first procedure receives notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Although an earlier civil action should not have a preclusive
effect in a later criminal prosecution, there are at least two other
ways in which a civil judgment may lead to the imposition of puni-
tive sanctions in a later proceeding. First, the civil judgment may
be admissible and relevant in a criminal trial as tending to prove
scienter-that the merchant was aware of the nature of the material
in question." Second, if the civil decision is an injunction, subse-
quent criminal prosecution does not prevent the state from also
punishing the defendant for contempt.57 The palpable unfairness of
this double barrelled sanction for the same conduct may not escape
interdiction under the double jeopardy clause.58
In summary, res judicata restricts some extravagances and
ameliorates some injustices of a system of dual sanctions. But the
availability of criminal prosecution to the government, the differing
burdens of proof in civil and criminal trials, and the regional varia-
tions in the standard of obscenity all reduce the effectiveness of the
shield of res judicata. So long as both civil and criminal remedies
exist, multiple and harassing prosecutions are possible. This points
to the desirability of a single sanction. Moreover, the procedural
complexities under two systems argue for the relative simplicity of
a single remedy.
The potential for abuse created by a regime of dual remedies
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959)), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971). But see Crane
Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332, 343 n.15 (2d Cir. 1973).
- 424 U.S. 669 (1976).
" See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVMENCE § 318 (2d ed. 1972).
51 See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594 (1895).
58 Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (fifth amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy embodies collateral estoppel as a constitutional requirement); Waller v. Florida, 397
U.S. 387 (1970) (second trial in state court for offense based on same facts that supported
conviction in earlier trial in municipal court constituted double jeopardy). But cf. Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (due process does not bar state prosecution for violation of state
criminal law after prior acquittal for federal offense involving same evidence).
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could of course be eliminated by repealing either criminal or civil
sanctions or both. The author assumes that society is not ready to
substitute extralegal sanctions like ostracism and social condemna-
tion for legal coercion. And if a legal remedy is to be chosen, the
advantages of criminal sanctions are outweighed by the advantages
of civil sanctions.
The costs of criminal obscenity were alluded to earlier: the
unfairness of imposing criminal penalties in an area permeated with
definitional vagueness and inconsistency, the complexity and ex-
pense of criminal prosecutions, and the victimless nature of obscen-
ity infractions. The benefits of criminal regulation of obscenity are,
on the other hand, fairly elusive. Professor Lockhart has argued that
the authorities need the criminal sanction because of the delay in-
herent in securing a "final" civil judgment." But he underestimates
the potency of injunctive relief, for protection against the distribu-
tion of obscenity need not await a "final" injunction. A court may
enjoin the altering or transporting of allegedly obscene material
immediately and without notice," and may issue an interlocutory
injunction against dissemination on short notice."1 A merchant who
ignores these injunctions may be held in contempt. On the other
hand, both civil and criminal procedure compel the state to let
distributors of alleged obscenity remain open for business until an
adversary adjudication has taken place.12 Thus, so long as the Con-
stitution demands certainty before expressive activity may be
curbed, both civil and criminal jurisdictions will allow some unpro-
tected material to escape.
Perhaps the strongest reason for retaining criminal statutes is
the symbolic value of such statutes as an expression of a com-
munity's moral outrage with the purveyors of obscenity. Certainly,
it would require great courage for a legislator to vote to repeal crimi-
nal obscenity laws. Perhaps it is for this reason that a complete
break with the practice of regulating obscenity criminally has yet
to be achieved. The President's Commission recommended that a
civil declaration be a prerequisite for criminal prosecution, but
would allow the authorities to proceed criminally first when mate-
rial is "unquestionably within" the category of obscenity." Even the
,' Lockhart, supra note 6, at 570-71.
" See text and notes at notes 158-166 infra.
, See text and notes at notes 150-152 infra.
12 Cf. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1973) (first amendment requires that
seized film be returned or copied so that showings may continue pending adversary proceed-
ings).
" COMM'N ON OBSCENITY, supra note 25, at 63; Lockhart, supra note 6, at 572.
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new statutory approach adopted by North Carolina retains dual
remedies, permitting criminal prosecution when a merchant persists
in conduct that has previously been condemned in a civil proceed-
ing. 4 However, in a period of waning consensus about the propriety
of obscenity regulation, the moral symbolism of criminal prosecu-
tions seems unduly harsh and repressive. Certainly, if civil regula-
tion can be shown to be equally, or more, effective in actually con-
trolling the distribution of obscene material, we can well afford to
abandon a symbol of a certitude that no longer exists.
Today both parties in the cultural struggle over obscenity are
united in favor of civil regulation-prosecutors disgruntled with the
complexities of the criminal process and merchants and their liber-
tarian allies horrified by the prospect of imposing criminal sanctions
on a bookseller. The merchants favor abandoning criminal sanc-
tions; the prosecutors, on the other hand, favor adding civil reme-
dies without disturbing the criminal sanction. However, if we are
interested in effective regulation with a minimum of abrasion, the
authorities need only a civil remedy. The most effective course is a
fresh start: abolition of the harsh and anachronistic criminal sanc-
tion, and exclusive reliance on a more humane civil remedy.
I1. THE NEED FOR STATUTORY REFORM
One who expects to find little civil obscenity litigation will be
surprised. The President's Commission reported in 1970 that eight-
een states had authorized in personam injunctions against obscen-
ity, and that five allowed in rem injunctions.65 Since then, civil
actions against obscenity have reached reported decisions in at least
twenty-four states," and the Supreme Court has rendered several
decisions on various aspects of obscenity nuisance."
Although the majority of reported civil obscenity judgments are
in personam, a minority of states have in rem obscenity nuisance
statutes66 that permit a plaintiff to bring an action against the
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2 (Supp. 1975).
, COMM'N ON OBSCENITY, supra note 25, at 332.
According to the author's research, since 1970 declaratory judgments or injunctions
involving obscenity have reached reported decisions in Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Ten-
nessee, Texas, and Vermont.
" See, e.g., McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976); MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S.
799 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449
(1975); Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
"1 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §§ 28C-28H (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 18.2-
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"obscene" property itself.69 When in personam and in rem injunc-
tions are analyzed, however, the differences are not significant
enough to compel separate treatment.70
In rem orders, like in personam decrees, may be enforced in
later contempt proceedings against a party. Moreover, in jurisdic-
tions having both criminal and civil sanctions for obscenity, an in
rem decree, like an in personam judgment, may provide the basis
for subsequent criminal prosecution." And constitutional safe-
guards apply to in rem and in personam injunctions alike. 2 Thus,
in McKinney v. Alabama" the Supreme Court established that an
in rem decision cannot attain a preclusive effect beyond the parties
to the action or persons closely related to the parties. The practical
effect of this ruling is to make the scope of in rem orders little
different from that of in personam decrees.
Yet, theoretically, in personam and in rem actions result in
different remedies. In personam actions end with total abatement
of the nuisance, or shutdown orders, while in rem actions proceed
item by item. However, recent decisions overturning in personam
shutdown injunctions on constitutional grounds have effectively
destroyed this distinction.74 Further, both in rem and in personam
injunctions ameliorate the asperities and uncertainties of criminal
prosecutions by resolving obscenity challenges civilly. The impor-
tant difference is not between in rem and in personam, but between
civil and criminal.
Many states have enacted nuisance statutes specifically de-
signed to control the distribution of pornography.7 5 In other states,
the authorities have sought injunctions against obscenity under
"general public nuisance" laws not drafted with pornography in
mind. Serious problems attend this latter practice. General public
384(2)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1975). See generally F. SCHAUER, supra note 6, at 197-98.
, See COMM'N ON OBSCENrry, supra note 25, at 332.
70 One possible distinction is that a proprietor may face less personal stigma when the
authorities place an allegedly obscene film or book on trial than when the proprietor is himself
charged with distributing obscenity.
" See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 281 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 18.2-384(13)
(Repl. Vol. 1975).
72 See McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 674 (1976).
11 McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976). See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971) ("Some litigants-those who never ap-
peared in a prior action-may not be collaterally estopped without litigating the issue.")
(dictum).
71 See, e.g., New Riviera Arts Theatre v. State ex rel. Davis, 219 Tenn. 652, 660, 412
S.W.2d 890, 894 (1967).
7' See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-01
(Repl. Vol. 1976).
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nuisance laws suffer from vagueness, overbreadth, and procedural
anachronisms that have little place in litigation that raises sensitive
first amendment issues.
The law imprecisely defines a nuisance as an unreasonable use
of property that hampers another's use and enjoyment of property.
Not surprisingly, the concept has earned the deprecating remark
that a nuisance is "a good word to beg a question with.""8 Tradition-
ally, nuisances have been divided into public and private: a public
nuisance affects the public at large; a private nuisance affects only
one individual or a limited group of individuals. Courts have held
that the legislature may define what constitutes a public nuisance
and confer equitable jurisdiction to abate it.
77
"Redlight" abatement statutes were generally enacted early in
this century for the purpose of shutting down properties used for
"lewdness, assignation, or prostitution. ' 78 Through a two-step pro-
cess of extension, these statutes have been construed to include
"lewd" entertainment, 79 and then, in some jurisdictions, bookstores
and theaters exhibiting "lewd" fare.80 This process of judicial exten-
sion is exemplified by the recent decision of the California Supreme
Court in People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater."1 The
California public nuisance statute condemns activity that is
"indecent" or "offensive to the senses."8 Refusing to distinguish a
pre-World War I decision that abated "an attraction known as the
'Sulton's Harem' conducted at the Panama-California International
Exposition," the court could discern "no satisfactory distinction
which would justify differential treatment of the pictorial represen-
tations in obscene magazines and films on the one hand, and 'live'
" Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REv. 317, 326 (1914).
See, e.g., Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31 (1890); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887); Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550, 22 N.E. 55 (1889).
" See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 100 1/2, § 1 (1975). The seminal statute was that of Iowa.
Law of April 3, 1884, ch. 143, § 12, 1884 Iowa Laws 146. See 20 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1920).
" See, e.g., Maita v. Whitmore, 365 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 508 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975); People ex rel. Hicks
v. "Sarong Gals," 27 Cal. App. 3d 46, 103 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1972); City of Chicago v. Geraci,
30 Ill. App. 3d 699, 332 N.E.2d 487 (1975) (masturbatory massage parlor); Washington Post,
Feb. 17, 1974, § 1, at 12, col. 7 (homosexual health club is nuisance per se).
See, e.g., MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799 (1975); General Corp. v. State ex rel.
Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 320 So. 2d 668 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Harmer v.
Tonylyn Productions, Inc., 23 Cal. App. 3d 941, 100 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1972); State v. Gulf States
Theatres, Inc., 270 So. 2d. 547 (La. 1972), vacated and remanded, 413 U.S. 913 (1973), rev'd
on remand, 287 So. 2d 496 (La.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974).
8' 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Note,
The Devil and the D.A.: The Civil Abatement of Obscenity, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1329 (1977).
" CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 370-371 (West 1957); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3479-3480 (West 1970).
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performances on the other."83
At one level, decisions such as Busch can be faulted for extend-
ing judicial equitable powers without the explicit sanction of the
legislature. 4 As Justice Tobriner noted in his dissent, "courts of
equity enjoy no roving commission to define public nuisances; they
may abate only such nuisances as the Legislature declares."85 He
further pointed out that the California Assembly and the state's
citizens had recently rejected a proposal for injunctive control of
obscenity;8 and he also stated that "there is no hint in the statutes
or the cases construing them that conduct can constitute a public
nuisance simply because some people stand philosophically opposed
to it."87 Obscenity nuisances could not subsist under the public
nuisance statute, he argued, because the nuisance was not public,
the definitions were too vague, and the remedies were too severe.
The inevitable response to such a sweeping interpretation would be
self-censorship. 8
More perceptive courts have refused to extend general public
nuisance statutes to proscribe "lewdness" in books and movies.88 An
Illinois court refused to extend a "lewdness" statute to enjoin the
dissemination of pornography, observing that the statutory lan-
guage would not bear the freight. So long as "a word is known by
the company it keeps," the court explained, the statute must be
"aimed solely and only at houses of prostitution."9 And other courts
13 17 Cal. 3d at 50, 550 P.2d at 604, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
1 Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976) (decision to deprive aliens of
an important liberty must be explicitly made by Congress or the President).
People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 63, 550 P.2d 600, 613,
130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 341, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
17 Cal. 3d at 70-71, 550 P.2d at 617-18, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
" Id. at 66, 550 P.2d at 615, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
Id. at 72-74, 550 P.2d at 619-20, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 347-48.
" See, e.g., Southland Theaters v. State ex rel. Tucker, 254 Ark. 192, 492 S.W.2d 421
(1973) ("roadhouse" does not include theater); Southland Theaters v. State ex rel. Tucker,
254 Ark. 639, 495 S.W.2d 148 (1973) ("roadhouse" does not include theater); Mini Art Operat-
ing Co. v. State, 253 Ark 364, 486 S.W.2d 8 (1972) (statute declaring nudist colonies public
nuisances cannot extend to movies depicting nudism); People ex rel. Busch v. Projection
Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328 (red light abatement law not
intended to apply to exhibition of obscene magazines or films), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); Harmer v. Tonylyn Productions, Inc., 23 Cal. App. 3d 941, 100 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1972)
(distinguishing live shows); People v. Goldman, 7 Ill. App. 3d 253, 287 N.E.2d 177 (1972);
State ex rel. Faches v. N.D.D., Inc., 228 N.W.2d 191 (Iowa 1975); State ex reL. Wayne County
Prosecutor v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 396 Mich. 244, 240 N.W.2d 460 (1976) (public
nuisance statute inapplicable to theater where sexual acts are not committed but are por-
trayed); State ex rel. Murphy v. Morley, 63 N.M. 267, 317 P.2d 317 (1957); Napro Develop-
ment Corp. v. Town of Berlin, 376 A.2d 342 (Vt. 1977).
" People v. Goldman, 7 Ill. App. 3d 253, 255, 287 N.E.2d, 177, 178-79 (1972). Accord,
People ex. rel. Carey v. Route 53 Drive-In, 45 Ill. App. 3d 81, 358 N.E.2d 1298 (Ill. App. 1976);
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have perceived that, although the first amendment protects live
entertainment, enjoining representational works such as films and
books raises more serious first amendment questions than does en-
joining a bawdy burlesque. 1 The Arkansas Supreme Court, revers-
ing a trial judge who had enjoined nudist movies under a statute
declaring nudist camps a public nuisance, pointed out that the
silver screen had been used to depict, not to practice, nudism.1
2
The most serious objection to applying general public nuisance
statutes to pornography, however, arises from the overbreadth and
vagueness problems created by such an extension. The possibilities
of overbroad application are illustrated by the decision of an Ari-
zona court upholding the application of a general public nuisance
statute to the showing of a sexually explicit film at a drive-in thea-
ter. 3 The court found that the possibility of exposure to children
outside the theater rendered the exhibition a public nuisance. But
not long after this decision, the Supreme Court in Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville94 rejected the notion that different standards of de-
cency could be applied to drive-in movie theaters, in ruling uncon-
stitutional a statute specifically directed at the showing of sexually
explicit but non-obscene films at drive-in theaters. Although the
Arizona court could not be expected to have anticipated Erznoznik,
its decision demonstrates how easily the public nuisance concept
can stray into constitutionally protected areas.
The vagueness of general public nuisance statutes is an even
greater constitutional problem than their overbreadth.9 5 Miller v.
California" requires that the applicable standard of obscenity pro-
scribe the depiction of specifically defined forms of sexual conduct.
This would appear to forbid injunctions obtained under common
State ex rel. Murphy v. Morley, 63 N.M. 267, 317 P.2d 317 (1957). In City of Chicago v.
Geraci, 30 Ill. App. 3d 699, 332 N.E.2d 487 (1975), however, the court held that a masturba-
tory massage parlor was a specialized form of prostitution. Id. at 704, 332 N.E.2d at 492.
" See, e.g., Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 464 Pa. 435, 461, 347 A.2d 290, 304 (1975)
(construing "lewdness" to refer only to "illicit sexual conduct" obviates vagueness problem
entailed if "lewdness" construed to include exhibition of obscene books and material), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
92 Mini Art Operating Co. v. State, 253 Ark. 364, 366, 486 S.W.2d 8, 10 (1972). See also
State ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 396 Mich. 244, 240
N.W.2d 460 (1976) (public nuisance statute inapplicable to theatre when sexual acts are not
committed but are portrayed).
'1 Cactus Corp. v. State ex rel. Murphy, 14 Ariz. App. 38, 480 P.2d 375 (1971).
" 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
'5 See State ex rel. Murphy v. Morley, 63 N.M. 267, 271-72, 317 P.2d 317, 319-20 (1957);
Gulf State Theatres, Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 489-92 (La. 1973) (court held that
the statute created a prior restraint).
" 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See F. ScHAUER, supra note 6, at 164-66.
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law nuisance acts, or redlight statutes. 7 But Miller also permits
courts to construe state statutes as incorporating constitutional ob-
scenity standards."' The question then becomes under exactly what
circumstances should a court read constitutional standards into ex-
isting law.
Even where the relevant statute includes the word "obscenity"
in some form, not all courts have been willing to construe it as
involving constitutional standards. Nevertheless, some courts have
followed what can only be described as a tortuous route to find that
even general public nuisance or redlight statutes also incorporate
the applicable constitutional standards. For example, the Okla-
homa Supreme Court read "offends decency" in the public nuisance
statute to include offenses under an obscenity statute, which in turn
had been construed to incorporate the current constitutional stan-
dard. 10 Thereafter, selling obscene material could be enjoined as an
illegal act which offends decency. And the California Supreme
Court read the public nuisance language "indecent or offensive to
the senses" to encompass "obscene" as judicially and legislatively
defined.' °' After this decision, California's total scheme is a little
bizarre: "lewd" in the redlight act may not be used for obscenity but
may be used against live entertainment; "indecent or offensive to
the senses" may be used against obscenity, primarily because it had
been previously used against live entertainment.1
2
In the shadow of these jerrybuilt constructions the attitude of
Chief Justice Heflin of the Alabama Supreme Court is healthy. His
position seems to be that courts may construe criminal obscenity
statutes to be commensurate with the constitutional ebb and flow;
but he registered skepticism as to whether the Alabama legislature
intended the state's Redlight Abatement Act to be employed to
control obscenity. By construing such a statute to incorporate con-
" See, e.g., Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 464 Pa. 435, 459, 347 A.2d 290, 303 (1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976) (quoting Grove Press, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F.2d
82, 88 (3d Cir. 1969)).
11 413 U.S. at 24 & n.6.
go Compare Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 39-42 (S.D. Tex. 1975),
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262 (1976); State v. "The
Bet," 219 Kan. 64, 70-71, 547 P.2d 760, 767 (1976); Magnum v. Maryland Bd. of Censors,
273 Md. 176, 187-88, 328 A.2d 283 (1974) with Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 464 Pa. 435,
443-46, 347 A.2d 290, 294-96 (1975); Theatre Guild, Inc. v. State ex rel. Rhodes, 510 S.W.2d
258, 259-60 (Tenn. 1974).
' State ex rel. Field v. Hess, 540 P.2d 1165, 1168-69 (Okla. 1975).
,0l People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 56, 550 P.2d 600, 608,




stitutional standards, the court, he stated, "goes beyond the pale of
permissible judicial construction and crosses over into the realm of
exclusive legislative drafting . . . .113 Justice Heflin is surely cor-
rect; for if the legislature did not intend redlight and general public
nuisance statutes to reach the dissemination of pornography, then
obviously it did not intend that those statutes be read to incorporate
the constitutionally mandated Miller standards."4 Yet if these stat-
utes are not construed to incorporate such standards, they are un-
constitutionally vague.
Other problems also inhere in applying general public nuisance
doctrine to pornography. When nuisance doctrine evolved from
liquor and prostitution regulation into obscenity regulation, it car-
ried a number of anachronisms with it."15 For example, reputation
testimony may be prima facie evidence of a public nuisance.10
Clearly, admitting such evidence in an obscenity nuisance proceed-
ing would undermine the constitutional standard for obscenity and
impermissibly reverse the burden of proof.
07
In sum, unreconstructed redlight and saloon doctrine is too
elastic, too imprecise, and too anachronistic to be used to close
bookstores and theaters. To control the channels of communication,
courts should proceed with constitutional procedure' 8 and constitu-
tional definitions of obscenity. 9 "The sword of public nuisance,"
Justice Tobriner has remonstrated, "is a blunt one, admirably de-
signed to curb noxious odors or to quell riots, but ill suited to the
delicate sphere of the First Amendment where legal overkill is
fatal.""0
III. THE PROPOSED CIVIL OBSCENITY STATUTE
Up to this point, the article has emphasized two main themes:
1) If declaratory judgments and injunctions are to emerge as truly
"3 General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 674, 320 So. 2d 668, 683 (1975)
(concurring opinion), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
,"I Also see Justice Tobriner's dissent in People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Thea-
tres, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 63-74, 550 P.2d 600, 613-20, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 341-48, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
I" See generally Gulf States Theatres, Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 491 (La. 1974).
,' See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-30-10.5-5 (1975).
' See text and notes at notes 208-213 infra.
", See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417-19 (1971); Oregon Bookmark Corp. v. Schrunk,
321 F. Supp. 639, 641 (D. Ore. 1970); General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657,
663, 320 So. 2d 668, 673 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
' See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973).
"1 People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 74, 550 P.2d 600, 620,
130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 348 (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
19771
The University of Chicago Law Review
civilized remedies, legislatures should repeal criminal obscenity
statutes and divorce civil obscenity from the criminal process. 2)
Because present civil obscenity statutes are unfocused, ill-defined,
and superannuated, legislatures should pass statutes specifically
designed to regulate obscenity civilly. The following statute is sub-
mitted to advance these goals.
1) The (courts of general jurisdiction) shall have jurisdiction
to adjudicate whether matter disseminated within the (county) is
obscene. "Disseminate" means to sell, lease, or exhibit or to hold
with intent to sell, lease, or exhibit. [Alternative: "Disseminate"
means to exhibit to the general public or where it can be perceived
by a substantial number of people; or to sell, lease, or exhibit or hold
with intent to sell, lease, or exhibit to (children).] "Obscene"
means (. . ).
2) The (prosecuting attorney) may begin a civil action in the
name of the state against any person or organization that dissemi-
nates any obscene matter. This action may be brought in any
(county) where the alleged dissemination occurs.
3) The (petition) shall describe with particularity the matter
to be adjudicated, allege obscenity and dissemination, and seek
remedies hereinafter provided.
4) When the state presents its (petition) the court may, with-
out notice to the defendant, grant a restraining order forbidding the
defendant from altering the matter, disposing of it entirely, or trans-
porting it out of the (county).
5) The court may grant a preliminary injunction against dis-
semination following notice to the defendant and a hearing sched-
uled to begin twenty-four or more hours after the defendant receives
notice.
6) The court shall not require the state to post security before
granting an interlocutory order. But if (the trial or appellate court)
enters a final judgment that the matter is not obscene, or if the state
dismisses the suit voluntarily before final judgment, then the court
may award to any party incorrectly subjected to an interlocutory
order the cost of defending against the orders, including reasonable
attorney's fees, and any damages or losses resulting from that order.
7) If the court grants an interlocutory injunction forbidding
dissemination, the defendant may demand and the court shall
schedule a plenary hearing within twenty days. The court shall
render judgment within ten days after the hearing.
8) The court shall allow any person or organization with a
pecuniary or artistic interest in the matter sought to be adjudicated
to intervene as a defendant. The court may permit any other person
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to appear as amicus curiae.
9) Any defendant may demand that the obscenity issue be
tried to a jury.
10) The (prosecuting attorney) must prove obscenity by clear
and convincing evidence.
11) Pursuant to a jury verdict that the matter is not obscene,
the court shall enter a judgment declaring the matter not obscene
and dismissing the action. Pursuant to a jury verdict that the mat-
ter is obscene, the court shall independently determine whether the
matter is obscene.
12) In cases tried to juries and to the court, the court shall
make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
13) Pursuant to a jury verdict and a judicial finding or, in a
case tried without a jury, a judicial finding that the matter is ob-
scene, the court shall declare the matter to be obscene. The court
may enjoin any or all defendants from disseminating the matter
adjudicated to be obscene.
14) Any party finally enjoined may appeal to the (appropriate
appellate court). Any party adversely affected may appeal any final
declaration or judgment to the (appropriate appellate court). The
(appellate court) shall independently consider whether to stay an
injunction. The appeal shall be submitted and decided expedi-
tiously.
15) If any party violates a restraining order or an injunction,
the court may issue an order to show cause and upon hearing hold
that party in contempt. The court may sentence any party found
guilty of contempt to no more than a ($500) fine and (ninety days)
imprisonment or impose any other lesser appropriate sanction.
16) Any person or organization with a pecuniary or artistic
interest in matter intended to be disseminated in the (county) may
sue the (prosecuting attorney) and ask the court to declare matter
not obscene and to enjoin prosecution. In this action, the (prosecut-
ing attorney) may counterclaim for a declaration of obscenity and
seek remedies as herein provided.
17) Declaratory judgment and injunction procedure which is
inconsistent with this statute shall not govern actions brought under
this statute. Except as herein provided, all actions brought under
this statute shall be governed by the procedure which governs ordi-
nary civil actions.
18) Actions under this statute shall be the exclusive method
of controlling obscenity. All inconsistent statutes are repealed.
The balance of this article will attempt to justify the provisions
of this statute through an analysis of obscenity nuisance law. The
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article will proceed in roughly chronological order, discussing stand-
ing, interlocutory orders, bonds, trials, right to a jury, final injunc-
tions, and post-injunction issues.
IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES BEFORE TRIAL
A. Standing and Related Problems
Under traditional equity doctrine public nuisance actions may
be brought either by public officials or by private persons who can
prove "special damages"; private persons who cannot show "special
damages" are denied standing.,,' Occasionally, modern obscenity
nuisance statutes broaden standing to include any resident of the
county,"2 or "any corporation or association formed in this state for
the suppression of vice."" 3 The rationale for expanding standing in
this manner is that "private attorneys general" will be more vigilant
in suppressing vice than their professional counterparts.
However, there are two basic reasons for retaining the public-
private distinction of traditional equity doctrine. First, as a general
rule, legislatures, not courts, should resolve society's general prob-
lems. If courts are called upon to solve general problems, authorities
accountable to the public should at least control the litigation
mechanism. Second, private citizens adequately animated to be-
come obscenity nuisance plaintiffs may lack the perspective and
discerning judgment on first amendment issues to be allowed to
control obscenity litigation. Public officials may show more cir-
cumspection about bringing frivolous or unnecessary suits.
For these reasons, the proposed statute allows suits only if
brought by the prosecuting attorney in the name of the state. The
statute requires that actions be brought by the prosecuting attorney
rather than the state attorney general because prosecutorial discre-
tion should be exercised on a local level. It specifies the prosecuting
attorney rather than "law enforcement officers""' so that this dis-
cretion will be exercised by a legally trained official.
Because the statute denies all standing to private litigants, no
showing of special damages would be required under traditional
"I Massachusetts Soc'y of Optometrists v. Waddick, 340 Mass. 581, 165 N.E.2d 394
(1960).
"I See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-3 (1975) (private plaintiff must post $1000 bond but
if successful recovers reasonable attorney fees); Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 3767.03 (Page 1971);
VA. CODE §§ 18.2-384(1), 385 (1975). See also Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 22 N.W. 641
(1885) (any person could sue to abate a liquor nuisance).
, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4712 (West 1968).
'" N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-06 (1976).
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equity doctrine. It is possible, however, that the special damage
requirement provides protection for first amendment values over
and above the protection afforded by restricting standing to public
officials. This possibility is illustrated by two decisions of the Cali-
fornia courts. In Harmer v. Tonylyn Products, Inc. I'" private plain-
tiffs sued to enjoin the exhibition of a film as a public nuisance. The
appellate court rejected the suit because only those who paid admis-
sion were exposed to the film, so the nuisance, if any, was not
"public." The court stated that the mere philosophical discomfort
of knowing that obscenity is afoot could not be analogized to an odor
or something palpably impinging on the senses."'
In effect, the Harmer court employed traditional standing doc-
trine of public nuisance law to extend the zone of privacy afforded
to consumers of sexually explicit expression. In Stanley v. Georgia"7
the Supreme Court held that an individual cannot constitutionally
be subject to a search for constitutionally suppressible obscenity in
the privacy of his own home. Harmer's invocation of the special
damages rule extended the protected zone to include self-selected
commercial establishments.
After Harmer, the Supreme Court concluded that the constitu-
tional right of privacy recognized in Stanley should not be extended
to protect the commercial distribution or exhibition of obscene ma-
terials to consenting adults."8 This undoubtedly influenced the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in rejecting one-half of Harmer in favor of
the notion that what consenting adults see in a book store or movie
theater may constitute a "public" nuisance. Over a vigorous dis-
sent, Busch v. Projection Room Theater"' ruled that "conduct of-
fensive to a community's moral sensibilities" is subject to civil re-
straint, even if that conduct takes place behind the closed doors of
a commercial establishment. But since public officials brought the
action in Busch, the court did not consider whether special damages
had been shown.'20
Concern for privacy values and the difficulty of clearly defining
suppressable obscenity have prompted Justice Brennan' 2' and Cali-
" 23 Cal. App. 3d 941, 100 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1972).
' Id. at 943, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 577. See also Napro Development Corp. v. Town of Berlin,
376 A.2d 342, 345 (Vt. 1977).
,, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
" Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
' People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 328, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
' Id. at 51, 550 P.2d at 605, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
121 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-114, (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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fornia Supreme Court Justice Tobriner 22 to advocate the Harmer
result as a general rule of obscenity regulation. Consenting adults,
they argue, should be allowed to consume any type of sexually ex-
plicit matter; state regulation should be limited to protecting un-
willing adults and children. The author personally accepts the
Brennan-Tobriner view. Although state regulation of sexually ex-
plicit material is appropriate when public displays or the peculiar
susceptibilities of children are involved, a business establishment
that excludes minors, charges admission, and clearly informs people
what is offered within, should be entitled to exhibit the annoying
or even the outrageous. The proposed statute's alternative defini-
tion of "disseminate" is intended to allow a jurisdiction to adopt
this alternative view. In functional terms, this definition imposes a
rule of special damages, as defined by Harmer, even though obscen-
ity nuisances may be brought only by public officials.
Under the alternative definition of "disseminate," courts would
normally be required to enjoin either public displays of obscenity or
sales to children. But additional problems may develop. Unlike or-
dinary movie theaters, drive-in theaters expose their screens to trav-
elers, neighbors, and groups of children. Although the Supreme
Court in Erznoznik suggested that unwilling viewers of drive-in
screens should merely "avert their eyes," 1? it is unrealistic to expect
a parent driving an auto containing small children in heavy traffic
to shield young eyes from the sight of a drive-in screen. Equity
should-and can-be more creative. Under the alternative defini-
tion of "disseminate," judges should call upon the remedial flexibil-
ity of equity and focus on the whole environment, abating unwar-
ranted dissemination with fencing requirements or changes in
screen location.
Furthermore, obscene books and pictures, unlike exhibition of
moving pictures, present the possibility of an outside resale business
to minors. 124 The proposed statute's alternative definition antici-
pates that resale is one of the types of dissemination that a court
may enjoin. But the authorities must proceed against the bootlegger
who resells rather than the merchant who sells legitimately to
adults. This is essentially the approach now adopted toward liquor
regulation. As is true with all "victimless" infractions, the authori-
'1 Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 86-100, 545 P.2d 229, 239-48, 127 Cal. Rptr.
317, 327-36 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
"2 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
12' Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 n.7 (1973). See also State ex rel. Field
v. Hess, 540 P.2d 1165, 1170 (OkIa.'1975).
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ties may find it difficult to suppress clandestine commerce in ob-
scene materials to minors. This is a common problem of sumptuary
regulation, however, rather than a peculiarity of civil obscenity.
The state's proper interest in regulating obscenity is to stop
distribution for commercial gain without interfering with constitu-
tionally protected privacy. Thus, the proposed statute's first defini-
tion of "disseminate" is intended to reach any commercial exploita-
tion of obscene materials. "Disseminate" includes both printed
material and motion pictures; "exhibit" includes other forms of
commercial exploitation such as broadcasting or performing. Juris-
dictions that wish to reach noncommercial purveyors may do so by
also enacting the first half of the alternative definition of
"disseminate." This extension, however, runs into the danger of
impermissibly interfering with constitutionally protected privacy.1'
A court confronted with an impermissible application of the ex-
tended definition should limit the statute by finding that a noncom-
mercial exhibition in the home does not constitute a "public" nuis-
ance.
B. Interlocutory Restraints
Generally, an interlocutory restraint is an order directing a
party to stop something or retain something pending the court's
decision on the merits. Interlocutory restraints serve two functions:
they preserve a controversy for later adjudication, and they ensure
that the court will be able to give full relief to the moving party. In
the sensitive area of free speech, however, interlocutory restraints
pose considerable danger. Orders that purport only to preserve the
status quo may deter or inhibit the defendant from further distribu-
tion, and thus may be final in practice."' Moreover, the commercial
and communicative value of expression-related materials is often
short-lived, making later reversal of an interlocutory order merely
symbolic if the occasion for the expression is gone forever.127 The
first question to resolve, then, is the extent to which interlocutory
restraints are compatible with the first amendment.
1. Ex Parte Orders and the Problem of Prior Restraints.
Whether a court may issue an interlocutory order restraining
12 Airways Theatre, Inc. v. Canale, 366 F. Supp. 343, 346 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); Grove
Press, Inc. v. Flask, 326 F. Supp. 574, 579 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
2' United Farm Workers v. Superior Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 902, 913, 537 P.2d 1237, 1244, 122
Cal. Rptr. 877, 894 (1975).
'2 See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (reversing a
three-year-old temporary injunction); Carroll v. President & Comm'rs, 393 U.S. 175 (1968)
(reversing a two-year-old ten-day restraining order).
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expression-related activity is generally approached under the doc-
trine of prior restraints. Unfortunately, definitional confusion
abounds in this area. 28 Generally speaking, a prior restraint is the
imposition of legal sanctions for the distribution of expression-
related material before a final adjudication of whether this distribu-
tion can be so restrained. 29 As applied to court orders and decrees,
prior restraints can occur in one of two ways: through the failure to
provide the necessary procedures before sanctions for distribution
are imposed, or through the rendering of an order or decree that goes
beyond the scope of the materials adjudicated. I shall call the for-
mer a procedural prior restraint, and the latter a remedial prior
restraint. The distinction can be illustrated by a simple example.
If a judge enjoins the December issue of the Law Review as obscene
without affording notice or a hearing to the editors, this is a proce-
dural prior restraint. But if a judge, after notice and a full hearing,
determines that the December issue of the Law Review is obscene,
and enjoins publication of both the December and January issues,
this is a remedial prior restraint. Remedial prior restraints will be
considered later; this section is concerned with procedural prior
restraints.
The most radical of interlocutory restraints are ex parte re-
straints, since the defendant is not even provided with notice before
the restraint issues. But, as a brief review of the Supreme Court's
major decisions on procedural prior restraints indicates, even the
basic question of the constitutionality of ex parte restraining orders
has not been definitively resolved.
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown 3' has been read as approving of
ex parte injunctions as part of a statutory scheme for the regulation
of pornography.' 3' The Supreme Court upheld a New York statute
that allowed municipalities to obtain civil injunctions against ob-
scene material and to obtain orders for the seizure of such material.
Under the statute, an ex parte injunction could be obtained, but the
defendant was entitled to a trial on the issue of obscenity within one
day, and to a decision within two days of the conclusion of the
I T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 503-12 (1970).
In Id. at 504. See Paper Back Mart v. City of Anniston, 407 F. Supp. 376, 378-79 (N.D.
Ala. 1976); Edelstein & Mott, supra note 38, at 547; cf. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint,
29 STAN. L. REv. 539, 542-43 (1977) ("The doctrine of prior restraint nullifies a particular prior
restraint without deciding whether the same speech could constitutionally be restricted by
'subsequent punishment.'" [citation omitted]).
" 345 U.S. 436 (1957).




trial.' 32 Thus the ex parte restraint was of very limited duration, and
was not the principal focus of the Court's decision.
Freedman v. Maryland, 33 probably the leading case on proce-
dural prior restraints, endorsed the Kingsley procedure, stating that
it "postpones any restraint against sale until a judicial determina-
tion of obscenity following notice and an adversary hearing.' ' 34 On
this reading, Kingsley did not involve an ex parte interlocutory
restraint at all. In the obscenity nuisance procedure authorized by
Paris Adult Theatre I, 135 an adversary hearing preceded the injunc-
tion and so the issue did not arise.
An examination of the logic of Supreme Court decisions outside
the context of ex parte restraints against obscenity strongly suggests
that such restraints are unconstitutional. Particularly important in
this regard are Freedman v. Maryland,'3 Carroll v. President &
Commissioners of Princess Anne, ,37 and Fuentes v. Shevin. 3
Freedman ruled that a system of administrative licensing of
motion pictures is constitutional only if conducted pursuant to
"procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censor-
ship system."' 3 The Court determined that a constitutional admin-
istrative licensing scheme must (1) assure a prompt judicial deter-
mination of obscenity; (2) place the burden of instituting judicial
proceedings on the administrator; and (3) limit the duration of any
restraint imposed prior to judicial review to that required briefly to
preserve the status quo.' Freedman suggests the possibility of im-
posing a restraining order before judicial review but after an adver-
sary administrative procedure. But it does not in any way support
dispensing with notice altogether.
Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne' con-
cerned an ex parte restraint outside the obscenity context. The
Maryland Court of Appeals had upheld an ex parte injunction
"1 354 U.S. at 437-38 n.1. The trial court appeared to assume a hearing before any
injunction. Burke v. Kingsley Books, Inc., 208 Misc. 150, 164, 142 N.Y.S.2d 735, 747 (Sup.
Ct. 1955).
' 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
,' Id. at 60. See also Stengel v. Smith, 18 App. Div. 2d 458, 459, 240 N.Y.S.2d 200, 201-
02 (1963); Tenney v. Liberty News Distribs., Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 770, 215 N.Y.S.2d 663
(1961).
1- 413 U.S. 49, 55 (1973).
" 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
1' 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
" 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
,3, 380 U.S. at 58.
' Id. at 58-59.
"' 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
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against a racist rally on the ground that the rally presented a clear
and present danger of violence. Although the Supreme Court re-
fused to disapprove of all ex parte orders, it declared this one un-
constitutional. The Court stressed three reasons why ex parte
procedures were inappropriate: the injunction forbade expressive
conduct; the order raised issues that required the trial court to re-
solve difficult factual and legal problems; and the defendants were
available for notice. These reasons apply with equal force to civil
injunctions of obscenity.
Lower courts have distinguished Carroll as involving political
speech, and have refused to apply it in the context of obscenity
injunctions, where the timeliness of expression is considered less
important.' But these courts often forget that a merchant has a
constitutional right to sell, and the public a first amendment right
to receive,' protected expression-even if it is sexually explicit.
And timing and momentum may be as important to the distributor
of sexually explicit expression as to the political publicist. Public
demand is often ephemeral, and even a short delay produced by an
interlocutory order can damage a business. Moreover, providing
notice is not particularly onerous in the obscenity nuisance context.
Most businesses have a telephone or a street address and can be
notified formally or informally without difficulty."'
The third source of relevant precedent lies outside the first
amendment context altogether. Fuentes v. Shevin"5 struck down as
inconsistent with due process a statute that allowed a plaintiff to
replevy personal property in the possession of another without no-
tice. The Court ruled that the state ordinarily cannot disturb a
constitutionally cognizable interest in property without providing
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Fuentes permits the state to
affect a protected property interest without notice only in an
"extraordinary situation."'46 Three prerequisites exist:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to
secure an important governmental or general public interest.
1,2 ABC Books, Inc. v. Benson, 315 F. Supp. 695, 700 (M.D. Tenn. 1970); Go v. Peterson,
14 Ariz. App. 12, 14, 480 P.2d 35, 37 (1971). But cf. United Farm Workers v. Superior Ct., 14
Cal. 3d 902, 537 P.2d 1237, 122 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1975) (groundbreaking opinion uses Carroll
reasoning in picketing case).
"I Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 756 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
"I FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b); Advisory Committee's Note to 1966 Amendments to Rule 65(b),
39 F.R.D. 124-25 (1966); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE § 2952
(1973).




Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action.
Third, the state has kept strict control over its monopoly of
legitimate force; the person initiating the seizure has been a
government official responsible for determining, under the
standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary
and justified in the particular instance.
147
The Court gave examples in which these criteria could be said to
have been met: tax collection, the war effort, bank failures, mis-
branded drugs, and contaminated foods.
48
Of course, some perceive obscenity regulation as the last bas-
tion shielding civilization from barbarism. They would analogize
the moral pestilence of obscenity to contaminated foods, and find a
compelling public interest that mandates an immediate ex parte
response. More realistically, however, lower courts that take
Fuentes's examples seriously should sanction ex parte restraints
against obscenity rarely if at all. Fuentes's third standard, requiring
state control of ex parte procedure, a statutory definition of the
emergency, and an emergency in fact, is also to the point. At a
minimum it precludes a private obscenity nuisance plaintiff from
securing an ex parte order. It reinforces the emphasis of Miller v.
California4' on precise standards, and the concern of Carroll for a
searching factual inquiry whenever possible.
The logic of Freedman, Carroll, and Fuentes argues strongly for
requiring notice before an interlocutory restraint may issue.' Simi-
IA? Id. at 91.
"' Id. at 91-92. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court distin-
guished Fuentes and allowed an installment seller to repossess property after an ex parte
judicial hearing and posting of sufficient bond. Mitchell apparently turned on the duality of
ownership-both seller and buyer had property interests in the property in question and the
statute involved provided a reasonable balancing of such interests. See Rendleman,
Analyzing the Debtor's Due Process Interest, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 35 (1975).
"' 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
' Grove Press, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82, 89 (3d Cir. 1969); Llewelyn v.
Oakland County Prosecutor's Office, 402 F. Supp. 1379, 1382-83 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Meyer
v. Austin, 319 F. Supp. 457, 463 (M.D. Fla. 1970); Newman v. Conover, 313 F.-Supp. 623,
631 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130
Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Camil v. Buena Vista Cinema, 129 Cal. Rptr.
315, 318 (Ct. App. 1976); State v. "The Bet," 219 Kan. 64, 547 P.2d 760, 769 (1976); Gulf
States Theaters, Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 489 (La. 1974); Commonwealth v. Guild
Theatre, Inc., 432 Pa. 378, 382, 248 A.2d 45, 48 (1968). See also Skinner v. Superior Court,
69 Cal. App. 3d 183, 137 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1977).
Several criminal obscenity decisions dealing with the procedural standards for the issu-
ance of search warrants are also relevant. At one time it appeared that the Constitution
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larly, Freedman and Carroll advance persuasive first amendment
reasons for requiring an adversary proceeding before a court may
impose an interlocutory restraint. Because it is difficult to separate
protected expression from obscenity, adversary procedures help as-
sure that the critical issues will be illuminated for the court. Cer-
tainly a court should hear both sides before embarking on the inevit-
ably difficult task of finding the facts, applying the law, and draft-
ing an acceptable order. An order to stop selling a book or exhibiting
a movie is final with respect to the sales and exhibitions pre-
vented15' Given the public's interest in communication and the
court's interest in precise tools for distinguishing obscenity from
protected communication, adversary procedures prior to the issu-
ance of an injunction do not entail difficulties too burdensome to
tolerate.
In short, the Constitution compels notice and an opportunity
to be heard before interrupting any phase of the right to sell or
receive expression-related material. Notice may be as informal as a
telephone call. And the adversary procedure that may lead to an
interlocutory injunction does not have to be a plenary trial.'52 It may
consist of no more than the opportunity to appear and present oral
argument in opposition to interlocutory relief. Beyond these require-
ments, however, further protection from interim equitable relief
should not be required. Courts quite properly hold parties who vio-
late interlocutory injunctions in contempt. The Vermont obscenity
nuisance statute forbids the imposition of punitive measures unless
the merchant violates a "final injunction." ' This, however, pro-
tects merchants more than due process requires.
required an adversary hearing before a warrant could issue for the seizure of obscene material.
A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) (plurality opinion per Brennan,
J.). See Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969). In Heller v. New York, 413
U.S. 483 (1973), however, the Court permitted the authorities to seize a movie print without
an adversary hearing. The facts of Heller are somewhat unique-the magistrate issuing the
warrant had personally viewed the offending picture before approving the seizure, and there
was no showing that the seizure of a ingle copy of the film precluded its continued exhibition
pending trial. Id. at 490, 492. The Court distinguished cases involving injunctions of exhibit-
ing a film or destruction of the print. Id. at 490. And in a companion case, the Court expressly
overturned a warrant that issued after an officer had seized the suspect picture. Roaden v.
Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
"5 Cf. Heller v. New York, -413 U.S. 483, 490 (1973) ("In this case, of course, the film
was not subjected to any form of 'final restraint,' in the sense of being enjoined from exhibi-
tion. . . ."); Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 221,
242-43.
5I FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2949 (1973).
" VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2809 (Supp. 1977).
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The proposed statute departs from traditional injunction proce-
dure to comport with the procedural safeguards required by the first
amendment. As the Court noted in Freedman, "[o]nly a judicial
determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary
sensitivity to freedom of expression." '54 To enjoin dissemination, the
proposed statute requires formal or informal notice to the defen-
dant, and a hearing not sooner than twenty-four hours after the
defendant receives notice. The twenty-four hour waiting period rep-
resents a compromise. A hearing immediately after notice might
attenuate the defendant's preparation and destroy his opportunity
to be meaningfully heard. Yet if the state has correctly filed the
action, two days is a long time to stand idly by muttering impreca-
tions while the defendant exhausts an inventory or fills a theatre
several times. While some may think one day is twenty-four hours
too much notice, the author considers it a necessary procedural
safeguard "designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship sys-
tem. 15
The statute permits general equity procedure to prescribe the
"nature and form" of interlocutory hearings. One caveat is in order:
"Since the essential reason for the requirement of a prior hearing is
to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations . . ., it is axiomatic
that the hearing must provide a real test."'5 6 Finally, Kingsley
Books and Freedman suggest two provisions that hasten final deci-
sions: a defendant who cannot disseminate because of a preliminary
order may demand a prompt hearing and decision on the merits;
and appeals "shall be submitted and decided expeditiously." These
provisions "assure a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the
deterrent effect of an interim and perhaps erroneous"'5 7 decision,
while recognizing the need for procedures compatible with sound
and considered decisionmaking.
2. Preservation Orders. Interlocutory restraints may be im-
posed without adversary procedures when they do not interfere with
a constitutionally cognizable interest."' The preservation order in
United States v. Little Beaver Theatrei" is an example of this. The
court, without notice, enjoined the theater from "disposing of, relin-
quishing possession of, or in any manner cutting, altering, splicing,
" Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
155 Id.
'" Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972).
'7 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
'' See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
, 324 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
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destroying or mutilating subject motion picture Turned on Girl for
a period of ten days . ... "60 The authorities apparently resorted
to ex parte procedure because they feared that the film might be
transported or altered,' yet they believed they could not seize it
under a search warrant without an adversary proceeding.
16 2
The Little Beaver injunction accommodates several interests:
the state receives an order backed by the court's contempt power
which preserves the evidence; the defendant is permitted to con-
tinue his business; and the court is able to adjudicate the obscenity
of a film that might otherwise end up in Mexico or the projection-
ist's wastebasket. Ex parte preservation orders are constitutional,
for they neither restrain expression prior to publication nor deter
future expression.
113
Obscenity nuisance statutes generally provide for preservation
orders.'64 Absent a statute, courts probably have discretion to issue
such orders under ordinary equity doctrine, despite the minor incon-
gruity that a Little Beaver order compels the defendant to preserve
the nuisance. Courts may also grant preservation orders ancillary to
a criminal case. In fact, both the state and the merchant may prefer
a preservation order to ex parte criminal seizure, since such an order
accomplishes everything ex parte seizure does without criminal
stigma.'6 5 Under a system of dual remedies, however, a defendant
may fear that the authorities are using equity to obtain discovery
for subsequent criminal proceedings. 66 This fear is legitimate, but
again it derives from the availability to the state of multiple reme-
dies, not from the nature of a preservation order.
3. Erroneous Interlocutory Orders. Statutes and rules com-
monly require a plaintiff who receives an interlocutory remedy to
post bond,' 7 which the defendant may recover upon if the order is
later determined to have been wrongly granted. Short of malicious
prosecution, the bond normally limits the plaintiff's liability for an
,6' Id. at 120.
16, Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 493 (1973); Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn,
416 F.2d 410, 412 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
162 Meyer v. Austin, 319 F. Supp. 457, 464 (M.D. Fla. 1970). But see Heller v. New York,
413 U.S. 483 (1973).
'1 See Go v. Peterson, 14 Ariz. App. 12, 13-14, 480 P.2d 35, 36-37 (1971).
,64 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-4 (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2(d)(3) (Supp.
1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3019 (1975).
,BS See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1973).
666 Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 463-65 (1975); Classic Distribs., Inc. v. Zimmerman,
387 F. Supp. 829, 833 n.6 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
67 See generally Dobbs, Shoull Security Be Required as a Pre-Condition to Provisional
Injunctive Relief?, 52 N.C.L. Ray. 1091 (1974).
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inappropriate interlocutory restraint.6 8 Unless the plaintiff truly
needs an interlocutory order and is confident of the ultimate out-
come, the cost of the bond and the chance of liability upon it may
deter him from seeking provisional relief.
Someone must bear the expense of an improvidently granted
interlocutory injunction. For a movie theater the expense might
include the cost of renting the enjoined print, lost profits from lower
ticket sales, and unrecoverable expenses related to advertising,
building rental, wages and salaries, and so forth.
As a general rule, the applicant for extraordinary relief should
protect the defendant against the risk of an incorrect interim order.
Interlocutory orders are frequently not appealable. Even if appeala-
ble, the reviewing court generally accords very deferential oversight
to preliminary injunctions, reviewing for abuse of discretion, not
correctness.'69 Moreover, appellate review is time consuming and
does not compensate for the past effects of an erroneous decision.
Despite these considerations, rules and statutes generally ex-
clude governmental plaintiffs from posting bonds when requesting
interlocutory relief,'70 and obscenity nuisance statutes are no excep-
tion. '7 General principles of sovereign immunity protect both the
judge72 and prosecuting attorney7 3 from liability for damages in all
but the most exacerbated instances.7 4 Under these circumstances
the expense of an erroneous interim decision falls on the merchant.
Obscenity nuisances thus present a compelling case for some
kind of governmental liability to deter hasty requests for interim
relief and to compensate for improper interlocutory restraints. Pro-
fessor Dobbs suggests that legislatures modify general security stat-
utes by making governmental units liable for improperly granted
interlocutory restraints, but without making them post a security or
bond. 7 5 The proposed civil obscenity statute incorporates this
suggestion. Power without restraint is unacceptable, particularly
"' Id. at 1122-23.
" See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Graver, 461 Pa. 131, 134, 334 A.2d 667, 669 (1975); Moore
v. State, 470 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
"' See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
' FLA. STAT. § 847.013(3)(d) (1976); N.Y. Cir. PRAc. LAW § 6330(4) (McKinney Supp.
1976) (also exonerating plaintiff from malicious prosecution). In Indiana, a private plaintiff
must post a $1000 bond but, if successful, recovers attorney's fees. IND. CoDn § 35-30-10.5-3
(1975). But see City of Aurora v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 16 Ill. App. 2d 273,
276, 147 N.E.2d 694, 695 (1958) (requiring $4000 bond).
"I Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967).
"' Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
" Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
' Dobbs, supra note 167, at 1165.
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given the political and cultural realities of obscenity litigation and
the fragile nature of expression. Governmental immunity creates
irresponsibility;' legislatures would do well to consider this pro-
posal carefully.
V. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AT TRIAL
Obscenity nuisances raise three procedural issues concerning
the conduct of the trial itself. First, should the court summon a jury
to decide the obscenity question? Second, what should be the stan-
dard of proof? And third, if the state proves that the material is
obscene, should the judge be compelled to enjoin further distribu-
tion, or should the nature of the relief be left to the judge's
discretion?
A. Right to Trial by Jury
The choice of criminal or equitable remedies is inextricably
linked to the issue of the right to jury trial. In a court of equity, the
judge finds the facts, applies the law, and formulates the relief.
I7
1
The judge may summon a jury to render an advisory verdict, 78 but
the defendant stands before the court without a right to jury trial,
whether the issue is the existence of a nuisance or the commission
of contempt.
79
The first line of defense of those who object to employing equity
to deprive the defendant of the safeguards associated with criminal
prosecution is the venerable maxim that "equity will not enjoin a
crime." Courts generally avoid the maxim with circumlocutions
such as "the mere fact that the act constituting a nuisance is also
a crime does not hinder the use of the civil processes to procure its
abatement where the use of property is a part."'80 But the maxim
expresses a wise policy about a defendant's procedural rights, par-
"' K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 25.01 (1972).
,17 Kane, Civil Jury Trial: The Case For Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HAST. L. J. 1, 5 (1966).
,78 FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
2335 (1971).
17" Eilenbecker v. District Ct., 134 U.S. 31 (1890); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
Unless punishment for contempt exceeds six months. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506
(1974); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
10 Goose v. Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit, 305 Ky. 644, 646, 205 S.W.2d 326, 328
(1947). See also Toushin v. City of Chicago, 23 Ill. App. 3d 797, 803-04, 320 N.E.2d 202, 207
(1974). The property requirement is, in fact, of little importance in statutory nuisances which
focus on conduct. See IOWA CODE § 123.70 (Supp. 1977) (defining an ambulatory liquor
nuisance: "[Tihe fact that an offender has no known or permanent place of business ...
shall not prevent . . .[an] injunction . . . from issuing.")
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ticularly the right to jury trial. 8 ' As recently as 1973, an Illinois
court refused to enjoin an "obscene" bookstore because "equity will
not enjoin a crime. 182
Nonetheless, the civil obscenity defendant should not be en-
titled to a jury trial simply because the criminal obscenity defen-
dant is. The civil action lowers the stakes. The defendant loses the
right to a jury trial and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but the
state must be satisfied with a milder remedy. The court may cir-
cumscribe the defendant commercially, but not personally. To
argue against the civil action because it lacks a jury trial is to argue
that the legislature must be as solicitous of the defendant's proce-
dural options when seeking a mild remedy as a harsh one.
Merchants probably have more to gain than prosecutors from
broad-based community participation in obscenity adjudication.
Jurors are drawn from across social classes, ages, races, and sexes.
In contrast, judges are predominantly selected from upper-middle
class white male lawyers. Where, as in obscenity regulation, the
issues are generational and cultural, the unanimity rule generally
followed in jury trials makes an adverse judgment less likely from a
jury than from a judge.' Thus, some who argue against an equita-
ble remedy are actually arguing for jury trial of obscenity, since they
think a jury will find for the merchant in close cases. Justice Tobri-
ner put it this way:
The fact that the public nuisance statutes relegate the decision
to a judge, rather than to a jury, exacerbates the chilling effect.
A dealer in protected material who might have been confident
that no group of 12 jurors would unanimously conclude that his
material offended community standards might find himself
inhibited by the greater uncertainty of how a single member of
the community-the judge-would react to it.'
Moreover, some may argue that a jury should be allowed, or even
encouraged, to nullify unpopular substantive law.' 5
"I See Southland Theaters v. State ex rel. Tucker, 254 Ark. 192, 492 S.W.2d 421 (1973).
"4 People v. Goldman, 7 Ill. App. 3d 253, 254, 287 N.E.2d 177, 178 (1972) (alternative
holding). But see City of Aurora v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 16 Ill. App. 2d 273,
147 N.E.2d 694 (1958).
11 See, e.g., Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 37 (S.D. Tex. 1975)
(two hung juries), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262
(1976). But see Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. Rxv. 518, 527 (1970)
(jury insensitive to first amendment interests).
I' People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 546 P.2d 733, 752 n.6, 128 Cal. Rptr.
229, 248 n.6 (Tobriner, J., dissenting), vacated, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr.
328, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
l' Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say NO, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 168 (1972).
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Different considerations animate prosecutors. Prosecutions are
protracted and expensive. If juries are often hung, or if they acquit,
then the authorities may be induced to cease to "beat a dead
horse."" 's Prosecutors may prefer judge-tried civil nuisance actions
over criminal prosecution for this very reason. 81 In a democracy,
however, public dislike of substantive law is a poor reason to allow
equitable relief.
88
A constitutional argument for a right to jury trial in civil ob-
scenity proceedings made in a challenge to Virginia's in rem obscen-
ity statute was summarily rejected by the Supreme Court.' In a
brief per curiam opinion, the Court held "a trial by jury is not
constitutionally required in this state civil proceeding."'90 A note-
writer has suggested that the Supreme Court's approval of nonjury
in rem procedure might not extend to in personam injunctions
where the control of conduct is involved.'' However, the traditional
wisdom is that a defendant's claim of a constitutional right to a jury
trial is at its weakest when a plaintiff seeks an in personam rem-
edy.8 2 Thus, when the Court rejected a right to trial by jury for in
rem obscenity, it foreclosed a jury for in personam injunctions.
The most persuasive argument for a jury is based on the nature
of the substantive obscenity standard set forth by Miller v.
California. "13 This argument began even before Miller with Justice
Brennan's dissent in Kingsley Books. "I Under substantive obscenity
law, the community sets the standard, and a jury represents a cross
section of the community. Therefore, Justice Brennan argued, a jury
is "the necessary safeguard demanded by the freedoms of speech
and press for material which is not obscene."' 95 In Miller, the Su-
preme Court, rejecting a national obscenity standard, enhanced its
emphasis on the community and the local jury as the arbiter of
Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1973, § C, at 1.
,82 Black, The Expansion of Criminal Equity Under Prohibition, 5 Wisc. L. REv. 412, 417
(1930).
'11 But see Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Pollitt, 258 Ky. 489, 80 S.W.2d
543 (1935) (equitable action held proper after grand jury refused to return indictment).
"I Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973), on remand, 214 Va. 539, 203 S.E.2d 441
(1974). The Court also approved the Maryland censorship and licensing process which oper-
ates without a jury. Star v. Preller, 419 U.S. 956, aff'g 375 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Md. 1974). See
also Dist. Att'y v. Three Way Theaters Corp., 357 N.E.2d 747 (Mass. 1976).
890 413 U.S. at 836.
Ill Note, Defects in Indiana's Pornographic NuisanceAct, 49 IND. L.J. 320, 327-28 (1974).
992 D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.6, at 74 (1973).
, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973). See note 5 supra.
'9, 354 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1957) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
892 Id. at 448.
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community values. '98 Hamling v. United States19 further stressed
the jury's role in discerning and applying community standards.
Justice Brennan renewed his argument for jury trial of obscenity in
civil cases in McKinney v. Alabama,1 18 but to no avail. Justice To-
briner has also recently contended that because of the definition of
obscenity, "[tihe jury, as a microcosm of the community, is the
only vehicle fit to conduct that inquiry."'
The Missouri Supreme Court grasped the essentials of the
Brennan-Tobriner argument in McNary v. Carlton.2°° The court
found that the diverse attitudes and desires of different communi-
ties in Missouri demand that neither residents of St. Louis County
nor residents of Dade County set standards for the other. Although
the court recognized that equity usually proceeds without a jury, it
compelled trial courts to try obscenity injunctions to "advisory"
juries." ' And the court ruled that the trial court would be bound by
a jury verdict that the material involved was not obscene.
2 2
Even though the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution
does not require a jury trial in a civil obscenity proceeding, the
explicit teaching of Miller and Hamling is that a jury is a useful
gauge. 23 It is possible that the Court will reexamine the jury ques-
tion, reject the nature of the remedy as the key, and require a jury
trial in both the criminal and civil obscenity context. 20 4 Better yet,
as Justice Brennan suggests, either the legislature or state appellate
courts may extend the right to jury trial to civil obscenity.2
" 413 U.S. at 30-34.
1 418 U.S. 87, 103-08 (1974). In the companion case, Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153,
160 (1974), the Court overturned a jury verdict of obscenity, stating that juries do not have
"unbridled discretion in determining what is 'patently offensive.'"
" 424 U.S. 669, 687-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
" People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 546 P.2d 733, 745-46 n.1, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 229, 241-42 n.1 (Tobriner, J., dissenting), vacated, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 328, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Cf. Vergil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1130 n.13
(9th Cir. 1975) (right to privacy) ("We believe that a determination founded on community
mores must be largely resolved by a jury subject to close judicial scrutiny to ensure that the
jury resolutions comport with First Amendment principles.").
1" 527 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1975).
211 Id. at 347-48.
"2 Id. at 348. Both trial and appellate courts must independently determine obscenity.
2I See, e.g., State ex rel. Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 396 Mich. 244, 245 n.3,
240 N.W.2d 460, 461 n.3 (1975) (advisory jury); Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973).
2" See DeSalvo v. Codd, 386 F. Supp. 1293, 1303 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Oakes, J., dissent-
ing).
205 McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 688-89 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). Appar-
ently there is no right to a non-jury trial. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,
510 (1959); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2317, at 84 (1970);
Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1176 (1961).
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The proposed statute follows Brennan's advice and extends
jury trial to civil obscenity. It requires the judge following ordinary
civil procedure to determine whether the plaintiffs evidence gener-
ates a jury question. A jury's exonerating verdict terminates the
proceeding. If the jury finds the matter obscene, the statute compels
the judge independently to determine whether the material is ob-
scene. This is patterned after the Missouri court's decision in
McNary v. Carlton,"0 8 and is intended to ensure "the necessary sen-
sitivity to freedom of expression." ' 7 In addition, the statute lays a
foundation for appellate review by asking the trial judge to draft
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
B. Standards of Proof
Normally, the civil plaintiff must persuade the factfinder by a
preponderance of the evidence.2 18 The proposed statute departs from
this and requires "clear and convincing evidence." Traditionally an
equitable standard, but also a standard a jury can apply,"0 9 "clear
and convincing" asks the factfinder to determine whether the pro-
ponent's contention is "highly probable." In a civil proceeding that
neither threatens the defendant's liberty, nor imposes a criminal
stigma, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is too imposing a standard
to administer."0 Yet as Justice Brennan has observed, "[i]n light
of the command of the First Amendment, a standard of proof by a
mere preponderance of the evidence poses too substantial a danger
that protected material will be erroneously suppressed." ' I sought
and found a compromise: clear and convincing evidence.
Civil obscenity trials otherwise present few problems of proof.
Blunderbuss anachronisms from the liquor nuisance era like allow-
ing "general reputation" evidence to show a prima facie nuisance
must be rejected. The use of reputation evidence would undermine
both the substantive constitutional standard attuned to the nature
of the materials, and Freedman's requirement of a judicial determi-
527 S.W.2d 343 (1975).
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
2C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVmFICE § 339 (2d ed. 1972).
"- Id. § 340; Van Hecke, Trial By Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. REv. 157, 169 (1953).
210 But see McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 690 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(beyond a reasonable doubt in civil cases).
2,, Id. at 685.
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nation.1 2 For defendants with poor reputations it would also reverse
the burden of proof.
21 3
C. The Chancellor's Discretion to Enjoin
After the jury's verdict and the judge's independent finding of
obscenity, the proposed civil obscenity statute returns to its equita-
ble origins. The judge determines the nature of the plaintiff's rem-
edy. Normally a chancellor possesses broad discretion to shape an
equitable remedy,"1 4 but some obscenity nuisance laws purport to
force the remedial hand. In Indiana, if the plaintiff sustains the
allegations in the petition, the act compels the judge to issue a
temporary injunction. 2 5 Under the Ohio statute, if the judge finds
that a theater is showing an obscene film, the relief is mandatory:
the judge must enjoin the nuisance perpetually, impose a $300 tax,
order personal property removed and sold, and abate the nuisance
by closing the theater for one year. 2 ' The Ohio Supreme Court held
that the word "shall" creates a mandatory duty to impose the reme-
dies provided, but moderated the statute's impact by insisting that
the judge find scienter before imposing the tax and limiting the
nuisance to a particular obscene film.
27
Louisiana's statute went even further. It compelled the judge
to grant a temporary injunction when the district attorney alleged,
with a verified affidavit on information and belief, that an obscenity
nuisance existed.28 This not only supplanted judicial discretion but
also omitted the usually rigorous standard for interlocutory relief.
The Louisiana Supreme Court struck it down. Holding that "shall"
meant mandatory interlocutory relief, the court declared the statute
invalid because the state could suppress alleged obscenity without
a hearing and a prior judicial determination.2 11
22 Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 46 (S.D. Tex. 1975), remanded
on other grounds sub nom. Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262 (1976).
21 Nihiser v. Sendak, 405 F. Supp. 482, 495 (N.D. Ind. 1974), vacated and remanded,
423 U.S. 976 (1976).
20. O. Fiss, INJUNCrIoNs 91-93 (1972).
212 IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-4 (1973).
2, OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3767.01-.09 (Page 1971).
217 State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 103, 104-05, 307 N.E.2d
911, 917-18 (1974), appeal dismissed sub nom. Art Theatre Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S.
923 (1975).
" 1918 La. Acts, No. 47 § 2, previously codified in LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4712 (1968)
(repealed 1974).
21, Gulf States Theatres, Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 485-87 (La. 1974). In response
to the Gulf States decision, the Legislature repealed the offending statute and substituted
what seems to be a constitutionally permissible system. 1974 La. Acts, No. 277, § 1, codified
at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4711-16 (Supp. 1976).
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Two Supreme Court opinions are instructive in this regard. In
Freedman, the Court said "because only a judicial determination in
an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to free-
dom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determina-
tion suffices to impose a valid final restraint."2 ' In Hecht Co. v.
Bowles22' the Court construed a statute providing that upon the
required showing an "injunction, restraining order, or other order
shall be granted" not to compel courts of .equity to depart from
traditional "qualities of mercy and practicality. '2 2 The judge could
conclude that the defendant had breached the substantive stan-
dard, yet, in response to promises to do better, refuse to enjoin.
223
Thus, if the legislature attempts to circumscribe the full range of
judicial discretion, it may unconstitutionally prevent a judicial de-
termination of obscenity. And in any event, courts of equity retain
discretion to ignore compulsory remedies.
The proposed statute preserves the judge's remedial flexibility.
The jury, if it is demanded, serves solely as a factfinder. When both
jury and judge find material to be obscene, the judge must enter a
declaration of obscenity. The declaratory judgment is a full-fledged
remedy because it gives the decision the force of law, precedential
value, and res judicata effect. But coercive remedies that must be
enforced with contempt are a matter of judicial discretion. The
statute says only that the judge "may enjoin" dissemination. This
allows the remedial discretion announced in Hecht Co. v. Bowles.
VI. THE NATURE OF THE FINAL INJUNCTION
Injunctions contain two parts: they specify who is obliged to
obey, and what they must do. In his 1897 article entitled
Government by Injunction,2 14 Mr. Dunbar complained, "A looseness
of thought is apparent in the decisions discussing the use of injunc-
tions which has tended to conceal the principles involved." '225 The
following discussion of obscenity nuisance injunctions will attempt
to avoid Mr. Dunbar's criticism.
A. Who Must Obey the Injunction?
The only significant problem in determining who is bound by
11 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
1l 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
222 Id. at 329.
223 See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 60-62 (1975).
224 Dunbar, Government by Injunction, 13 LAW Q. Rav. 347 (1897).
22 Id. at 358.
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an obscenity injunction is the product of bad doctrine from the turn
of the century. The in rem injunction, which was used primarily to
abate saloons, restrained "all persons" from illegal activity on the
described premises. This permitted a court to hold in contempt any
person who acted contrary to the injunction, even if he was not a
party to the suit and was ignorant of the injunction. 26 By substitut-
ing constructive notice for actual knowledge, in rem injunctions
obviated enforcement and proof difficulties. But in so doing they
created serious due process and first amendment problems.
Obscenity nuisance statutes sometimes achieve an in rem effect
by permitting injunctions that restrain both the defendant and the
property on which the nuisance was discovered. 22 Courts have occa-
sionally enjoined "the defendant and all other persons, ' 26 or "any
person. '229 But, whether the nuisance involves liquor or pornogra-
phy, holding a person in contempt of an injunction of which he has
no notice violates elemental principles of due process. 20 The first
amendment probably precludes in rem obscenity nuisances as well.
In Smith v. California,23' the Supreme Court reversed a conviction
under an ordinance that made simple possession of obscene books
illegal. The Court held that to permit conviction for possession with-
out proof of scienter or knowledge would inhibit freedom of expres-
sion by booksellers. Injunctive theories that attempt to punish peo-
ple who lack knowledge of an interdiction run afoul of the same
principle.2
32
The proposed statute eliminates in rem injunctions and allows
the court to enjoin only "any or all defendants." By implication, the
court cannot "enjoin" the property, nor can it compel nonparties to
comply. The general law of injunctions goes somewhat further and
permits courts to punish a defendant's agents or cohorts who violate
an injunction. 233 The author anticipates that courts would use the
proposed statute to enjoin named defendants, and general equitable
In See, e.g., Silvers v. Traverse, 82 Iowa 52, 47 N.W. 888 (1891). See generally Rendle-
man, Beyond Contempt: Obligors to Injunctions, 53 Tx. L. REv. 873, 911-16 (1975).
227 IND. CODE § 35-30-10.5-4 (1973).
2 See Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask, 326 F. Supp. 574, 578 (N.D. Ohio 1970), vacated, 413
U.S. 902 (1973).
" Speight v. Slaton, 356 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (Morgan, J., dissenting),
vacated and remanded, 415 U.S. 333 (1974).
' See generally Rendleman, supra note 226, at 884-88; Comment, Community Resist-
ance to School Desegregation: Enjoining the Undefinable Class, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 111, 128-
32, 140-43 (1976).
-1 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
212 State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 101-02, 307 N.E.2d 911,
916 (1974), appeal dismissed sub nom. Art Theatre Guild v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923 (1975).
3 Rendleman, supra note 226.
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doctrine to prevent defendants from breaching injunctions through
the use of alter egos or straw men. In no event, however, should the
court attempt to bind individuals who lack actual knowledge of the
original injunction.
B. What May Be Enjoined?
Commentators traditionally employ two variables in analyzing
the "what" part of injunctions.24 The first variable, broad to nar-
row, refers to the amount of conduct the injunction forbids. The
second variable, imprecise to specific, refers to the particularity
with which the injunction describes the forbidden conduct. An in-
junction that intrudes upon sensitive first amendment interests
brings related but distinct concepts into play. An overly broad in-
junction may run afoul of the constitutional proscription of prior
restraints, and an imprecise injunction may be infirm because it
violates the constitutional vagueness doctrine.
Before examining particular types of final injunctions, a further
word about prior restraint doctrine is required. This article earlier
divided prior restraints into procedural and remedial restraints, and
discussed procedural restraints in the section on pretrial proce-
dures.25 Remedial restraints are found in the part of the injunction
that describes "what" conduct is forbidden. Remedial restraints can
be further subdivided into "hardcore" restraints and "standards"
restraints.
Hardcore restraints prevent future expression because of past
expression. An example would be: "Because we dislike the May
issue of the Law Review, you may not publish at all in June."
Hardcore restraints, when identified as such, seldom cause courts
any trouble and are almost invariably held unconstitutional. Stan-
dards restraints are illustrated by the well-known decision in Near
v. Minnesota.2 13 A Minnesota public nuisance statute permitted the
state to enjoin "a malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspa-
per.27 Near appealed from an injunction that forbade, in part, "any
publication whatsoever which is a malicious, scandalous or defama-
tory newspaper, as defined by law . . . ."2 In other words, the
injunction simply adopted the standard embodied in the statute,
without specifying further what content could not be published. The
23 Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HAav. L. Rav. 994, 1064-67 (1965).
23 See text and notes at notes 129-157 supra.
-8 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Id. at 702.
= Id. at 706.
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constitutionality of standards restraints in the obscenity nuisance
context is unclear and will be discussed below.
To summarize, injunctions may be constitutionally invalid for
one of three reasons: vagueness, hardcore prior restraint, or stan-
dards prior restraint. The article will turn to litigated obscenity
injunctions, beginning with the easiest, and apply this frame of
reference. Because haziness attends prior restraint doctrine, the
analysis will be greeted with inconstant success. But the frame of
reference allows some intelligible generalizations to be adduced.
1. Hardcore Prior Restraints.
a. Shutdown orders. Many statutes permit obscenity injunc-
tions that close an establishment where pornography has been dis-
seminated,231 and at least one court has approved such an injunc-
tion."' Other courts have disapproved requests for shutdown or-
ders. 241 A court that closes a business associated with past offensive
expression effectively prohibits the proprietor from disseminating
protected materials from that location in the future. 22 Thus, shut-
down orders represent a clear-cut case of hardcore prior restraints.
Although this would appear to be obvious, the Michigan Court
of Appeals, in approving the padlocking of a theater for one year,
nevertheless sought to distinguish a shutdown order from a prior
restraint. 243 First, the court reasoned, since the defendants remained
"' See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7204 (1976 Supp.); IND. CODE §§ 35-30-10-5-4, 35-
30-10-56 (1973). The Indiana statute includes complex bonding, taxing, and release provi-
sions which are not discussed herein. The district court reprobated these provisions in
Nihiser v. Sendak, 405 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ind. 1974), but the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded over Justice Brennan's cogent dissent. Sendak v. Nihiser, 423 U.S. 976 (1975).
24" Bloss v. Paris Township, 380 Mich. 466, 157 N.W.2d 260 (1968).
241 Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 43-44 (S.D. Tex. 1975),
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262 (1976); General Corp. v.
State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 320 So. 2d 668, 675-76 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904
(1976); People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 59, 550 P.2d 600, 610,
130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 338, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); State ex rel. Blee v. Mohney
Enterprises, 154 Ind. App. 244, 247-48, 289 N.E.2d 519, 521, (1973); Hall v. Commonwealth
ex rel. Schroering, 505 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Ky. 1974); New Riviera Arts Theatre v. State, 219
Tenn. 652, 659-60, 412 S.W.2d 890, 893-94 (1967); Napro Development Corp. v. Town of
Berlin, 376 A.2d 342, 349 (Vt. 1977).
2"2 Speight v. Slaton, 356 F. Supp. 1101, 1107 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (Morgan, J., dissenting),
vacated and remanded, 415 U.S. 333 (1974); General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeten, 294 Ala.
657, 320 So. 2d 668, 675 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Sanders v. State, 231 Ga.
608, 613, 203 S.E.2d 153, 157 (1974). As the court in Sanders points out, a shutdown order is
also a particularly noxious procedural restraint because the order, without according any
procedural safeguards, suppresses matter that the defendant could have disseminated in the
future. Id. See generally Edelstein & Mott, Collateral Problems in Obscenity Regulation: A
Uniform Approach to Prior Restraints, Community Standards, and Judgment Preclusion, 7
SETON HALL L. RaV. 543 (1976).
241 State ex rel. Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 59 Mich. App. 223, 237, 229
N.W.2d 389, 396 (1975), rev'd, 369 Mich. 244, 240 N.W.2d 460 (1976).
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free to exhibit nonobscene films elsewhere, the padlocking order was
a sanction for past conduct, rather than a restraint on future con-
duct. Second, because individuals convicted of distributing obscen-
ity could be imprisoned for up to one year, the defendants should
not be heard to complain about the less severe padlocking sanc-
tion.2
44
The court's attempt to distinguish shutdown orders from prior
restraints is unpersuasive. Whatever the defendants were free to do
elsewhere, to forbid them access to this facility and equipment re-
stricts their future freedom of communication, and is an ill-
concealed hardcore restraint. Moreover, an analogy to criminal rem-
edies ignores the point that the state may not mete out criminal
punishment under the reduced protection of civil procedure. If the
state's interest in closing a building is to exact a punishment for
past conduct, then it must proceed against the defendant under
criminal, rather than civil, procedures. Finally, if the offending dis-
tributor rents the building, a padlocking order deprives the build-
ing's owner of property without due process of law.
245
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
holding that the authorities could not employ the Redlight Nuis-
ance Statute against motion pictures. While the court did not pass
on the prior restraint issue, it registered disapproval of the injunc-
tion, since it could be "used to suppress materials not found to be
obscene."24 The author would prefer a more explicit repudiation of
the pernicious doctrine of the lower court.
b. Bonding requirements. After finding that obscenity has
been disseminated, some courts have forced the owner or proprietor
to post a bond as a condition of keeping the business open.247 This
varies the analysis applied to shutdown orders, but does not change
the result. The bond does not prohibit future conduct because of a
finding of illegal past conduct; it merely qualifies the defendant's
first amendment rights by imposing a burdensome condition on
244 Id.
21 Gulf States Theatres, Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 492 (La. 1973). See State ex
rel. Keating v. Pressman, 38 Ohio St. 2d 161, 311 N.E.2d 524 (1974) (per curiam); cf. State
ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Gladstone, 64 Mich. App. 55, 235 N.W.2d 60 (1975)
(nuisance abatement statute invoked to close down property being used for purposes of
prostitution).
246 State ex rel. Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 396 Mich. 251 n.15, 240 N.W.2d
460, 464 n.15 (1976).
24 See State ex rel. Leis v. William S. Barton Co., 45 Ohio App. 2d 249, 255, 344 N.E.2d
342, 346 (1975) (per curiam); DEL. CODE ANN. § 7204 (1976 Supp.). But see Universal Amuse-
ment Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 43-44 (S.D. Tex. 1975), remanded on other grounds sub
nom. Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262 (1976).
[44:509
Civilizing Pornography
their future exercise. By bearing unequally on different dissemina-
tors of expression, the bond inhibits expression the authorities dis-
like. Such a requirement is equivalent to an unconstitutional at-
tempt to tax knowledge.
248
On the other hand, a bonding requirement tied to an injunction
against particular material that has been adjudicated obscene
should be permissible. Such a narrowly drawn bond was approved
by an Ohio state court of appeals. In an earlier decision, Ohio's
obscenity nuisance statute had been restricted to enjoining particu-
lar films declared obscene. 219 Subsequently, in State ex rel. Leis v.
William S. Barton Co., 25 the court approved an order requiring a
bond for the full value of the business to ensure that a film adjudi-
cated to be obscene would not be exhibited there again. This bond-
ing requirement is not a hardcore restraint since it does not use past
illegal conduct to preclude future nonadjudicated conduct, nor can
it be said to condition or tax future distribution of presumptively
protected expression.21
This type of limited bonding requirement more closely resem-
bles an injunction that specifies the penalty for violation, or a coer-
cive contempt award where the judge tells the contemnor what it
will cost to violate again, than a hardcore prior restraint. Of course,
any bonding requirement ties up assets rather than merely admon-
ishing. But losing litigants traditionally pay taxable expenses for
marshalls, sheriffs, and witnesses, and the bond premium can be
conceptualized as part of the price of losing instead of a lien on
future conduct. Even this narrow form of bonding requirement,
however, should be limited in duration and open to modification or
dissolution when conditions change.
2. Unconstitutional Vagueness. Policymakers frequently
employ imprecise directives to deal with irreconcilable interests.
When the General Court in colonial Virginia instructed tavern
keepers "nor on the Sabbath Day suffer any person to tipple and
drink more than is necessary, 2 2 it had in mind the comforts of both
religion and an occasional nip. But equity requires that injunctions
2 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244-51 (1936). Cf. Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513 (1958) (unconstitutionality of denial of tax exemption to veterans who refuse
loyalty oath).
2 State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 307 N.E.2d 911 (1974),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Art Theatre Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923 (1975).
21 State ex rel. Leis v. William S. Barton Co., 45 Ohio App. 2d 249, 253-55, 344 N.E.2d
342, 346-47 (1975).
2' See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936).
22 6 Hening's Statutes 73 (1748).
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delineate proscribed conduct with specificity, to avoid both uncer-
tainty about what is forbidden, and excessive discretion in the way
injunctions are enforced.
2 53
Statutory vagueness is a well-known vice of constitutional di-
mension in expression-related areas. Vague injunctions should be
set aside on constitutional grounds for some of the same reasons. A
criminal statute must be precise enough to give fair notice of the
conduct it forbids, and to guide the discretion of enforcement offi-
cials.2 4 Similarly, an injunction should be clear enough that the
ordinary person can discern what conduct it proscribes.25 Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton58 approves injunctions against obscenity,
"assuming the use of a constitutionally acceptable standard for de-
termining what is unprotected by the First Amendment." '57 As a
matter of course, courts refuse to enforce injunctions that, on their
face, abridge communication or conduct protected by the first
amendment.2 Impermissibly vague injunctions should also be over-
turned as unconstitutional.
259
Imprecise injunctions nevertheless appear in reported deci-
sions. One enjoined "conducting the business of selling obscene lit-
erature in violation of [the state obscenity statute]" ;28 another
forbade the continued existence of the statutory nuisance of obscen-
ity;28' a third interdicted not only certain specific magazines, books
and items, but also what the court called "similar items";2 12 a fourth
enjoined the showing of Lysistrata "or any other motion picture film
of the same character."2 3 Blanket injunctions with catch-all phrases
such as "maintenance of their business so as to annoy the com-
munity" are equitable overkill. The first amendment protects a lot
See generally D. DOBBs, REMEDIEs § 2.10 (1973).
"I Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972); Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975);
Attwood v. Purcell, 402 F. Supp. 231, 234-36 (D. Ariz. 1975); F. ScHAUER, supra note 6, at
158-64.
25 See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 437-38 (1976); United
States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519 F.2d 1236, 1246 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
428 U.S. 910 (1976).
z' 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
27 Id. at 55.
211 United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971).
29 Paris Follies, Inc. v. State ex rel. Gerstein, 259 So. 2d 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(per curiam); Mitchum v. State ex rel. Schaub, 250 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1971).
21 Mitchum v. State, 244 So. 2d 159, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
211 Society to Oppose Pornography, Inc. v. Thevis, 255 So. 2d 876, 878 (La. Ct. of App.
1972).
2'2 Moore v. State, 470 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).




that will "annoy" some people. 214 Such vague injunctions breach the
fundamental rule, grounded in equity and constitutional law, that




3. Standards Orders. Is an injunction that forbids a defendant
to disseminate "obscenity" defective when analyzed correctly?
Such a standards order could, of course, violate the vagueness doc-
trine. If it does, it should be invalidated on this basis. But an order
that copies the Supreme Court's latest statement of standards
seems well within the wit of man. If the order is so precise and
specific that "defendants do not even need a dictionary to learn
what is prohibited since the parenthetical material following the
Latin-derived words makes the order clear, 2 6 then the defendant's
vagueness attack should fail.
The more serious question is whether such standards orders are
constitutionally infirm under the holding of Near v. Minnesota.67
Recall that Near invalidated an injunction that prohibited the pub-
lication of a "malicious, scandalous or defamatory" newspaper.
28
The exact reason for the Court's ruling is, however, difficult to dis-
cover. The decision makes little sense if the Court thought that the
injunction was merely a standards order. The Court assumed that
penal libel statutes were constitutionally permissible,6 9 and the
civil injunction merely personalized a parallel criminal statute.
Under a standards order, the newspaper could publish, be charged
with contempt, and defend on the ground that the statements were
not "malicious, scandalous or defamatory." This is nearly identical
to the paper defending a criminal libel prosecution by arguing that
because the statements were not libelous, it had not violated the
statute.
Other language in the opinion indicates that the Court viewed
the injunction as compelling the publisher to clear material in ad-
vance with the judge.2 0 In other words, the injunction created a type
of hardcore restraint not unlike an advance licensing scheme. On
this reading, the key to understanding Near is that it forbids "a
judgment [that] would lay a permanent restraint upon the pub-
2, Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1975); Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971).
2,1 Teamsters Union v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Moore v. State, 470 S.W.2d 391, 396
(Tex. Civ. App. 1971). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
' Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770, 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
27 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
2" Id. at 701-02.
2 Id. at 720.
278 Id. at 706, 712. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 205.
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lisher, to escape which he must satisfy the court as to the character
of the new publication."'7 Under this interpretation, which the au-
thor accepts, a standards injunction of obscenity that does not put
the trial court in the role of an advance censor would not violate the
doctrine of Near.
In some jurisdictions standards orders may be invalid because
of the rule that equity will not enjoin a crime.212 The traditional
ground for the maxim is that the state possesses an adequate rem-
edy at law in a criminal prosecution. In addition, a defendant who
breaches an injunction that merely personalizes a criminal statute
may be unfairly exposed to both criminal punishment and con-
tempt.23 Moreover, while a criminal defendant may argue that the
statute under which he is convicted is unconstitutional, a defendant
in a contempt proceeding may not challenge the constitutionality
of the injunction because of the collateral bar rule.274 Finally, proce-
dural advantages for the state lurk in injunctions personalizing
criminal statutes. Under present law, a contemnor can be impris-
oned for up to six months without benefit of a jury trial.
275
Nevertheless, most jurisdictions reject these arguments and
permit courts to issue injunctions against crimes. 27 An injunction
forbidding "obscenity" or specifying standards is distinguishable
from criminal punishment because it gives the defendant one free
bite: a court finds the defendant's activity illegal but withholds
punishment until he commits a second violation. Thus, the
"obscenity" or standards injunction grows out of the practice of
allowing the authorities to choose between civil and criminal reme-
dies. By abolishing the criminal sanction, raising the civil burden
of proof, and allowing a jury trial of obscenity, the proposed statute
obviates much of the unfairness of a standards injunction.
The proposed statute nevertheless allows 'the judge to enjoin
defendants from disseminating only "matter adjudged to be ob-
scene." This limits injunctions to specific books or films and, by
implication, forbids a "standards" order. To be sure, a case can be
made for standards orders. As a Texas court pointed out, if courts
cannot employ such an injunction, "the State must bring suit each
time the defendants change the obscene menu in their passion
' Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 712 (1931).
2'2 See, e.g., Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770, 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
2 Kuang Hung Hu v. Morgan, 405 F. Supp. 547, 548 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
2" See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 334 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting).
21 Maita v. Whitmore, 508 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1974).
2' D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.11 (1973).
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pits." '277 But the author thinks that the argument advanced by Jus-
tices Brennan and Tobriner carries the day. Obscenity and pro-
tected expression are closely related, and the standards for ascer-
taining obscenity are inherently imprecise. If civil obscenity allows
"standards" injunctions, the authorities could secure a "standards"
order and threaten the defendant with contempt. Thus, although
the statute would repeal criminal statutes, the harassing technique
of threatening prosecution-and the resulting chill on the market-
place of ideas-would reenter by the side door. The proposed statute
seeks to prevent the authorities from using a "standards" injunction
to threaten contempt in the same way they may now use penal
statutes."
VII. POST-INJUNCTION ISSUES
The article will next consider three issues that arise after a
judge issues an injunction. First, what principles should govern the
award of stays pending appeal? Second, what should become of the
material that is declared obscene? And third, what sanctions should
courts be permitted to impose for contempt?
A. Stay Pending Appeal
Unless an enjoined litigant obtains a stay, the injunction re-
mains in effect pending appeal. As a general rule, either the trial
court or the appellate court may grant a stay, but appellate courts
often give considerable deference to trial courts in determining
whether to stay an injunction. 9 The proposed statute adopts ordi-
nary rules of appellate procedure with two exceptions. It requires an
expedited appeal, and it forces appellate courts to consider indepen-
dently whether to grant a stay. The latter requirement is designed
to ensure that the propriety of a stay pending appeal is considered
by a detached tribunal as well as by the trial court.
71 Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770, 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
21 If a jurisdiction wants to adopt the statute but allow "obscenity" or "standards"
injunctions, the legislature should:
1) amend § 13 adding "or any other material which is obscene as defined in § 1." States
with the equivalent of federal rule 65(d) cannot incorporate by reference but must define
obscenity in the injunction.
2) amend § 15 to provide a contempt procedure commensurate with Freedman v.
Maryland: notice, an adversary judicial determination, brief or no restraints, and a prompt
decision, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965), in addition to the usual apparatus of criminal contempt.
21 Mitchum v. State, 234 So. 2d 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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B. Destruction of Obscene Material
What happens to the books or film prints found obscene? The
Tennessee Supreme Court declared, "Once a film is judicially deter-
mined to be obscene it becomes contraband and may properly be
destroyed without violating the rights of anyone.1 211 Many statutes
and reported court orders command officials to "seize and destroy"
obscenity. 8' Destruction has its roots in the law of deodands, requir-
ing the forfeiture or demolition of objects that offend, injure, or
kill 1 2 The Supreme Court approved its use in conjunction with
adjudicated obscenity in Kingsley Books. 8 3 Certainly, destruction is
an obvious solution to the real risk that the enjoined material will
reappear in the stream of commerce.
However, burnt offerings and revenge against objects are an-
achronisms. Demolition smacks too much of bookburning, a prac-
tice incompatible with an open and democratic society. Destruction
of obscene materials is also inconsistent with other facets of obscen-
ity law. Although the Supreme Court has permitted the authorities
to regulate the dissemination of pornography, private
"consumption" of legally obscene material is beyond the ambit of
permissible interdiction. 28 4 Moreover, obscenity doctrine varies
through space and time. Tolerance for sexually explicit matter may
flourish under city lights but wither in country air. And if recent
history is any guide, one generation's "dirty book" is assigned read-
ing for the undergraduates of the next.
The proposed statute does not allow officials to destroy mate-
rial adjudged.obscene. Although the court may enjoin the defendant
from disseminating it, the proprietor may keep the matter at home,
ship it to a more salubrious environment, or wait for the local cli-
mate to change. If time alters community standards or legal doc-
trine, the defendant may ask the court to modify or dissolve the
injunction.2?8 The statute confronts the risk that the owner will dis-
obey the injunction, but relies on the power of contempt rather than
a bonfire.
2o Taylor v. State ex rel. Kirkpatrick, 529 S.W.2d 692, 698 (Tenn. 1975).
2' See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 6330(3) (McKinney 1976).
2 Exodus 21:28: "If an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he shall be stoned and
his flesh not eaten."
"' Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 444 (1957).
211 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).




C. Sanctions For Contempt
Flexibility, the byword of equitable remedies, should guide the
choice of remedies for contempt. The proposed statute permits the
court to fine, imprison, or "impose any other lesser appropriate
sanction" for contempt. Thus, the statute permits retributive sanc-
tions for less than the prescribed maximum. Courts that try crimi-
nal contempt cases should apply the appropriate criminal safe-
guards under the rules and statutes of the jurisdiction.
In addition, the statute allows the court to use civil contempt,
either remedial or coercive. Remedial contempt occurs when the
judge compels a violator to compensate someone damaged by the
breach of an injunction. Commentators have analogized obscenity
to assault,26 and courts should be allowed to use remedial contempt
to impose "assault" damages on a breaching defendant. Coercive
contempt occurs when the judge tells a violator to comply with the
injunction or face a specific penalty, often on a timed basis, for
continuing to flout the order. Courts should also be able to use
coercive contempt orders to achieve compliance with civil obscenity
injunctions.28
CONCLUSION
The assumption that language can be refined to distinguish the
obscene from the merely explicit is probably fallacious. Minds can
identify obscenity, but definition plays a small role in the labeling
process. The verbal formula adopted in Miller v. California211 pur-
ports to focus the decisionmaker's attention on the issues. But be-
cause obscenity is such a cluster of social and psychological forces,
definitions are too subjective and morally connotative to bring fair-
ness and predictability to obscenity regulation.
Obscenity regulation consists of people exercising power over
people. It is most realistically viewed as a specialized legal process
whereby authorities specify particular material as being too sexually
explicit for others, and enforce this decision by imposing sanctions
for distributing this material. Accordingly, this article has over-
looked definition and has examined the process by which a determi-
nation of obscenity is reached. It has sought to develop a process
' T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 91 (1966).
21 Coercive orders cannot include security or the equivalent of security against any
future obscenity; this is an impermissible hardcore restraint. See State ex rel. Leis v. William
S. Barton Co., 45 Ohio App. 2d 249, 258-60, 344 N.E.2d 342, 348-50 (1975).
I" See note 5 supra.
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that makes possible a full and fair accommodation of the competing
interests and values at stake.
Civil obscenity is the worst and best of remedies. The equitable
approach displays execrable excesses: it can render equity the hand-
maiden of the criminal law, turn to clandestine ex parte procedure,
deprive a defendant of trial by jury, and perpetrate massive seizures
and shutdowns.29 But equity also exhibits exemplary features: it
accords a civilized warning, reduces the stigma of state control, and
focuses on the critical issue of obscenity rather than irrelevant pro-
cedural technicalities. This article and the statute it proposes at-
tempt to eliminate the worst and consolidate the best. The author
hopes this modest effort will assist in forming a new consensus about
the appropriate role of the state in regulating sexually explicit ex-
pression.
2 See Judge Morgan dissenting in Speight v. Slaton, 356 F. Supp. 1101, 1104-08 (N.D.
Ga. 1973), vacated and remanded, 415 U.S. 333 (1974); State v. Gulf States Theatres, Inc.,
270 So. 2d 547 (La. 1972), rev'd, 287 So. 2d 496 (La. 1974).
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